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ARTICLES
ANTITRUST IMMUNITY, THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND SETTLEMENTS: DEFINING THE BOUNDARIES
OF THE RIGHT TO PETITION

RAYMONDKu·

INTRODUCTION

In the United States, the First Amendment l and the antitrust laws 2 serve as
twin pillars upholding our political and economic liberty.) What happens,
however, when these powerful laws collide? This Article examines the interplay
of the antitrust laws and the First Amendment right to petition,4 or what is more
commonly referred to as Noerr-Pennington immunity.s In brief, Noerr provides

• Associate Professor ofLaw, Thomas Jefferson School ofLaw; Director, Center for Law,
Technology & Communications. A.B., Brown University; J.D., New York University School of
Law; Fellow, Arthur Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Program (1994-95). I would like to thank
Michael Farber for his insightful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts ofthis Article as well
as the faculties of Southern Illinois University School of Law, St. Thomas University School of
Law, and Thomas Jefferson School of Law where earlier versions of this Article were presented.
1 would also like to thank my research assistant Carlos Cabrera for his assistance. Special thanks
to my wife, Melissa, for her comments, patience, and support without which this would not have
been possible.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. See Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.c. § I (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) ("Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be iIlegal."); 15 U.S.C. § 2 ("Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ....").
3. See United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972) ("Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as
important to the preservation of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of
Rights is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms.").
4. "Congress shall make no law .. . abridging the freedom of speech, or ofthe press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
5. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine, hereinafter Noerr, refers to a series of decisions by the
United States Supreme Court beginning with Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
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immunity from antitrust liability for anticompetitive harms that flow from
exercising the right to petition. 6 While significant attention has been paid to the
potential for Noerr immunity to be misused in efforts to use governmental
processes to impose costs upon competitors,7 there has been virtually no
discussion with respect to whether the First Amendment right to petition may be
used to immunize cooperative/collusive behavior that could nonetheless
adversely impact competition. s This has been compounded by the Supreme
Court's failure to articulate a clear explanation for when private conduct is
considered immune under the First Amendment. 9 Moreover, while there have
been scholarly efforts to provide a coherent doctrine governing when private
conduct is immune from antitrust liability, none has provided a doctrinal
explanation of Noerr immunity through the lens of the right to petition that is
consistent with its historic role in Anglo-American government. lO Specifically,

Motor Freight, inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657
(1965), in which the Court recognized antitrust immunity for certain conduct related to the right to
petition.
6. See generally 2 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 989-1016
(3d ed. 1992) (discussing Noerr doctrine) [hereinafter ALD].
7. See ROBERTH. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 347
64 (1993); Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Liability/or Attempts to Influence Government Action: The
Basis and Limits 0/ the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977); James D.
Hurwitz, Abuse o/Governmental Process, the First Amendment, and the Boundaries ofNoerr, 74
GEO. L. J. 65 (1985); David L. Meyer, A Standard/or Tailoring Noerr-Pennington Immunity More
Closely to the First Amendment Mandate, 95 YALEL. J. 832 (1986); see also City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 380 (1991) ("The 'sham' exception to Noerr
encompasses situations in which persons use the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome
of that process-as an anticompetitive weapon.").
8. For one of the few examples of such a discussion, see Susan P. Koniak & George M.
Cohen, Under Cloak o/Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051 (1996), examining collusion between class
action counsel with respect to attorneys' fees and whether such abuse is sanctionable. See also
Harry M. Reasoner & Scott J. Adler, The Settlement of Litigation as a Ground for Antitrust
Liability, 50 ANTITRUSTL. J. 115 (1981).
9. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Making Sense ofAntitrust Petitioning Immunity, 80 CAL. L.
REv. 1177, 1178 (1992) ("The problem was more than a failure to set forth clear general rules for
defining the scope of the immunity. The larger problem was that, as the exceptions were defined,
adjudication consisted of pasting a conclusory label on the petitioning activity at issue."); David
McGowan & Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust Immunity: State Action and Federalism, Petitioning and
the First Amendment, 17 HARV. J. L. & Pus. POL'y 293, 298 (1994) (noting that the area of law is
replete with "doctrinal confusion").
10. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1202 ("What justifies antitrust immunity is not the
means chose 'but a disinterested and accountable decisionmaking process for choosing those
means. As long as neither the government nor its officials has a financial interest in the
governmental action, antitrust immunity should apply to both the government and the petitioners.");
Gary Minda, interest Groups. Political Freedom, and Antitrust: A Modern Reassessment of the
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 905 (1990) (analyzing petitioning immunity under
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this Article examines whether settlement agreements and consent decrees
resulting from what would otherwise be immunized litigation are protected from
antitrust scrutiny and liability under Noerr. In order to conduct this analysis, this
Article develops a methodology for detennining immunity by focusing the
immunity examination upon the means used to petition government and the
source of the alleged injuries. II Ultimately, private conduct is immune from
antitrust scrutiny when it represents a valid attempt to persuade an independent
governmental decision-maker in an effort to solicit government action, and the
alleged injuries result from that persuasive effort.'2 The validity of any effort
depends upon the forum in which the petitioning is conducted without reference
to antitrust. By focusing upon the means used to petition government, this
analysis ensures that Noerr immunity protects the people's right to petition their
government for the redress of grievances without unnecessarily limiting the
protection afforded by the antitrust laws.
One commentator has observed that "[t]he notion that the settlement of
litigation-a practice so favored in the administration of justice-is in itself a
ground ofantitrust liability rings strange to the ear.,,13 Before we decide whether
the instrument needs tuning or our hearing needs testing, consider two
hypotheticals:
1) Netscape sues Microsoft in private antitrust litigation raising
antitrust, intellectual property, and state unfair competition
claims. During the course of the litigation, the parties begin to
negotiate and realize that it would be mutually advantageous for
the two leading providers ofInternet browser software to divide
the market between themselves rather than continue litigating
and competing against one another. For example, Microsoft
might agree to cease distribution of its browser and instead

public choice theory).
In one of the most lucid discussions on this topic, Professor Elhauge argues for a functional
process approach in which immunity is primarily determined by examining the "incentive structure
underlying the decisionmaking process that produces the restraint ..." Elhauge, supra note 9, at
1180. Others have argued that immunity should be examined under principles akin to public fora
analysis in free speech cases. See McGowan & Lemley, supra note 9. More often, commentators
attempt to interpret Noerr immunity through the filter of federal antitrust policy. See, e.g., Meyer,
supra note 7, at 832 (proposing that "immunity [should] not be granted when . . . petitioning
produces unnecessary direct antitrust injury and the governmental action sought is illegitimate.")
(emphasis added); James S. Wrona, A Clash o/Titans: The First Amendment Right to Petition vs.
the Antitrust Laws, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 637, 656 (1994) ("When analyzing antitrust cases
involving petitioning to the government, courts focus on whether the activity's effect would
seriously offend traditional antitrust policies. . . . This approach maintains a delicate balance
between two important principles.").
II. See infra Part ".
12. See infra Part /I .
13. Reasoner & Adler, supra note 8, at lIS .
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incorporate Netscape's browser into its Windows operating
system. In exchange, Netscape would agree to drop its lawsuit
and share revenues with Microsoft. The end result of course
would be an agreement between the two dominant players in the
browser industry effectively dividing the market between
themselves.
2) A group of small to mid-size book sellers sue the various
publishing companies alleging price discrimination in response
to an industry practice in which book publishers sell various
titles to larger retail establishments such as Barnes & Noble at
significantly discounted prices. During the litigation, the
plaintiffs enter into settlement agreements with each of the
various publisher defendants setting an appropriate wholesale
price for books with each of the settlement agreements
containing a most favored nation clause that incorporates the
most favorable price reached in the negotiations of each
agreement. Once the final settlement is reached, there will
effectively be a single, uniform wholesale price for books
throughout the entire industry. In the final coup de grace, the
parties could even ask the court to approve the terms of the
settlement agreement and enter them as part ofa consent decree.
I f entered into outside of the context of litigation, these hypothetical agreements
would almost certainly be subject to antitrust scrutiny, and could potentially
result in significant antitrust liability.14 The critical question, therefore, is
whether the context and nature of entering into these agreements with respect to
the settlement oflitigation are sufficiently distinct under constitutional principles
to remove them from the purview of antitrust laws.
The implications ifsuch immunity is recognized are staggering. Ifsettlement
agreements such as these are immune from antitrust scrutiny under Noerr and the
participants immune from liability, no one, not the Federal government, the
various state governments, let alone competitors, would be permitted to challenge
or even examine the terms and consequences of the agreements-this immunity
is the essential promise of the right to petition as recognized under Noerr.15
When combined with the growing use of protective orders to cloak settlement
agreements in secrecy, 16 entire industries may be monopolized, prices fixed, and

14. The first hypothetical could be considered a horizontal restraint of trade or a conspiracy
to monopolize the web browsing industry. See I ALD, supra note 6, at 60-77, 195-96. The second
hypothetical could be considered an unreasonable restraint of trade as a result of price fixing. See
id. at 63-67.
15 . See infra Part LB .
16. See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 283 (1999) (discussing
secrecy in the settlement process).
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have their markets divided, without anyone being the wiser. So, while the notion
that settlement agreements may be the basis for antitrust liability "may ring
strange to the ear," the opposite conclusion also strikes a rather discordant note.
Immunity under these circumstances represents a loophole large enough to
swallow the Sherman Act itself. Despite this potential, the highest court to touch
upon this issue to date suggested that so long as the litigation itself is not a sham,
immunity is compelled by Constitutional principles. 17
This Article analyzes the right to petition and the Noerr doctrine and
suggests that immunity under Noerr is justified only when the conduct in
question represents valid petitioning, and argues that settlement agreements and
consent decrees should not be immune from antitrust scrutiny even when a court
is asked to approve the agreement prior to dismissal. Part I examines the history
. of the right to petition and doctrinal development of the right in the antitrust
context, and how that case law could be used to support a claim for immunity.
Part II develops from the right's history and the Supreme Court's case law, a
methodology for determining when private conduct is immune from antitrust
scrutiny under Noerr and the right to petition. Part III examines the context of
private settlements under the proposed methodology and concludes that in the
context ofthe settlement oflitigation, the historical,jurisprudential, and doctrinal
justifications for immunity are noticeably absent. After examining whether
judicial approval of settlements and their incorporation into consent decrees are
sufficient to justify Noerr immunity, Part IV concludes that the right to petition
is still insufficient to justify antitrust immunity.
I. ORIGINS

Before exam ining whether settlement agreements and consent decrees should
be protected by the right to petition, a brief discussion of the origins of the right
is in order. The right to petition is the capstone right of the First Amendment,
but, outside the context of antitrust, it is seldom discussed or invoked in
constitutional jurisprudence: s When it is discussed, it is usually treated as

17. See Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d 1525,
1528-29 (9th Cir. 1991), afJ'd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 49 (1993). The Supreme Court has
never directly addressed this issue. In Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 (1931), the
Court examined whether certain cross-licensing agreements between patent holders entered into in
order to settle infringement suits violated the Sherman Act. See id. at 168. While the decision
could be interpreted to recognize that settlement agreements are not immune from antitrust laws,
the decision predates Noerr, and as such, the Court was not directly confronted with the issue of
immunity. Similarly in United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963), decided
after Noerr, the Court once again examined whether cross-licensing agreements entered into to end
litigation violated the antitrust laws. See id. at 177-78. Despite being asked, the Court specifically
refused to address whether the settlement agreements themselves could form the basis for antitrust
liability. See id. at 190 n.7.
18. See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Significance
ofthe Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAML. REv. 2153 (1998); Norman B. Smith, "Shall Make No Law
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simply part ofthe rights offree expression and association. 19 Even in the context
of antitrust law, the development of the right to petition is a relatively recent
event. It was n6t until 1961 in Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc.,2° that the Supreme Court slowly began to interpret the right
to petition and how it impacts antitrust law.

A. The History
1. The Classical Right ofPetition ing.-H istorically, the right to petition was
considered one of the most fundamental of English and colonial American
rights. 21 In England, the petition was used to secure the Magna Carta, and its
abuse by James II "led directly to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and to the Bill
of Rights that fully confirmed the right to petition as an element of the British
constitution [sic]. ,>22 By the Seventeenth Century, petitioning was considered an
ancient right and was part of the regular political life ofthe English.23 According
to one commentator, unlike freedom of speech, press, and assembly which were
in practice constantly restrained, by the Eighteenth Century, the right to petition
was an absolute right in England. 24
Likewise, in the American colonies and the United States prior to the Civil
War, the right to petition was equally esteemed. For example, in 1641 the
Massachusetts Bay Colony Assembly became the first colony to affirm the right ·
explicitly, and, by its terms, the right applied to residents and non-residents, free
and not free alike.
Every man whether Inhabitant or fforreiner, free or not free shall have
libertie to come to any publique Court, Councell, or Towne meeting, and
either by speech or writing to move any lawful!, seasonable, and
materiall question, or to present any necessary motion, complaint,
petition, Bill or information, where of that meeting hath proper

Abridging . .. ": An Analysis a/the Neglected, but Nearly Absolute, Right a/Petition, 54 U. ON.
L. REV. 1153 (1986); Julie M. Spanbauer, The First Amendment Right to Petition Government/or
a Redress a/Grievances: Cutfrom a DljJerent Cloth, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 15, 17 (\ 993);
Stephen A. Higginson, Note, A Short History o/the Right to Petition Government/or the Redress
0/ Grievances, 96 YALE L.J. 142 (\986). For a general overview of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the right to petition, see John E. Theuman, Annotation, Right 0/ Petition and
Assembly Under Federal Constitution's First Amendment-Supreme Court Cases, 86 L.Ed.2d 758
(1985); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, The Supreme Court and the First Amendment Right to
Petition the Government/or a Redress o/Grievances, 30 L.Ed.2d 914 (1973).
19. See Rydstrom, supra note 18, at 915.
20. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
21 . See Mark, supra note 18, at 2169; Smith, supra note 18, at 1153; Spanbauer, supra note
18, at 17; Higginson, supra note 18, at 155.
22. Smith, supra note 18, at 1160.
23. See id. at J 157.
24. See id. at 1162-68; see also Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 17 (arguing that "[h listorically,
the right to petition was a distinct right, superior to the other expressive rights.").
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cognizance, so it be done in convenient time, due order, and respective
manner?5
As one commentator notes, the "Colonial experience appears not only to have
replicated England's widespread use of the petition, it likely extended it in both
law and practice.,,26 In part, this was because the petition was a useful means for
colonial assemblies to expand their sphere of influence by expanding both the
types of matters the assemblies had jurisdiction to consider and their power to
gather facts relating to the petitions.27 Petitions covered all sorts of subject
matter from disputes over land, termination of entail, and financial assistance to
emancipation?8
Additionally, the right to petition not only covered diverse subject matter but
was exercised by the elite as well as individuals and groups who were otherwise
. excluded from voting and other means of formal political participation.29 For
example, in the colonies and the fledgling United States, the right was exercised
by disenfranchised groups such as women, blacks, Native Americans, and
children. 3D The fact that the right to petition extended to such disenfranchised
groups may be surprising to us today, but it is quite understandable given the
origins of petitioning. Petitioning originally arose under Monarchial rule when
everyone was subordinate to the divine authority of the King. 31 No one had the
right to vote, participate in ruling, or any of the other political rights recognized
in the United States today.32 As such, petitioning arose as the original, and for
a time, the only protected means for subjects to seek limited political change. 33
While the subjects could not change or challenge their ruler's authority short of
revolution, the right of petition allowed them to attempt to change the rules and
how they were applied. Given the origins of the right and the important role it

Mark, supra note 18, at 2177 (citation omitted).
Id at2175.
27. See Higginson, supra note 18, at 146-47.
28. See Mark, supra note 18, at 2182-85.
29. See id. at 2182-87.
30. See id.
3 L See id. at 2164 ("Magna Carta is, however, hailed as the progenitor of English
constitutional liberty because it came to provide a formal check on royal authority that could be
exercised by other segments of English society as welL").
32. See id. at 2165 .
By requiring the petitioners to acknowledge the primacy of the king ' s authority, even
the barons' petitions thus reinforced the hierarchy of the community to which all
belonged. Although the barons' petitions could force the King's attention, their
petitions .. . do not . .. immediately appear to have contained within themselves the
empowering or dignity-enhancing features we today associate with the exercise of
liberties.
Id
33. Cf Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 32 (" [P]etitions were the only authorized channel
through which criticism of the government was funneled.").
25.
26.
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played in English and colonial American history, it should not come as a surprise,
therefore, that it was expressly included in the vast majority of state declarations
ofrights, or that Maryland, New York, North Carolina, and Virginia, specifically
insisted thatthe right be guaranteed when they ratified the Federal Constitution. 34
The debates surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment also
demonstrate that the right maintained its significance even in the new republic.
"The democratic experience of the Confederation period led not to a belief that
petitioning was irrelevant, but instead renewed the question of whether, as it
were, the ante should be upped. Should petitions become instructions rather than
mere prayers?,,35 In the debates that ensued, Congress rejected the notion that the
people should have the right to instruct their representatives, but reaffirmed the
principle that their petitions must be respected.
Instruction, then, was the enemy of deliberation, and not just because
each state's or each district's parochialism might subvert the common,
national good. Instruction also rendered deliberation superfluous
because the representative could do only what his instructions mandated.
Better, said the Federalists, to avoid this problem and take the advice and
wisdom ofthe people through their speech and the press, and, when they
assembled among themselves and conveyed their grievances, through the
time-honored method of petition. Congress was meant to be not a "mere
passive machine," but rather a "deliberative body." Petition would serve
that end, instruction would destroy it.36
In rejecting the right of instruction while embracing petitioning, Congress
implicitly recognized that individuals, through petitioning, could command the
government's attention, but not any particular result. In the early years, Congress
put this understanding into practice as it "attempted to pass favorably or
unfavorably on every petition ... ,'>37 a practice which continued until the swell
ofemancipation petitions overwhelmed Antebellum Congresses,38 and Americans
had informally replaced the classical conception of petition and reciprocal
obligation with "[b]rute political power grounded in the franchise.,,39
2. The Promise.-Two features, the right to be heard and immunity, are
central to the classical right of petition. Functionally, the right to petition "was
an affirmative, remedial right which required governmental hearing and
response.,,40 Petitioning was a means by which individuals could have the King,
the Commons, colonial assemblies, state legislatures, Congress, and the courts
redress private and public grievances. 41 In England, the right represented "a

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See Smith, supra note 18, at 1174.
Mark, supra note 18, at 2206.
Id. at 2211-12 (footnotes omitted).
Higginson, supra note 18, at 143 .
See id. at 158-165; Mark, supra note 18, at 2212-26.
Mark, supra note 18, at 2226.
Higginson, supra note 18, at 142.
See Mark, supra note 18, at 2168.
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mechanism that bound the English together in a web of mutual obligation and
acknowledgment of certain commonalities."42 The right
reflected an element ofreciprocal obligation, embodying the recognition
of hierarchy both in that every petition was a prayer to authority for the
grace ofassistance as well as an implicit acknowledgment by the petition
that the King ... had authority-that is, legitimate power-to resolve the
complaint. In accepting the petition, the King, in turn, acknowledged a
duty to subjects, one that had come to mean both hearing the complaint
and not exercising power in an arbitrary fashion. 43
Likewise in colonial America:
Petitioning provided not just a method whereby individuals .. . might
seek reversal of harsh treatments by public authority, judicial or
otherwise, but also a method whereby such individuals could seek the
employment of public power to redress private wrongs that did not fit
neatly into categories of action giving rise to a lawsuit. In that sense,
even individual grievances embodied in petitions carried powerful
political weight simply because of the individual's capacity to invoke
public power. 44
Accordingly, the petition was a formal mechanism that allowed individuals to
focus government attention on public or private issues of their choosing with a
corresponding right to be considered. In other words, the right to petition
allowed individuals to exert some control over legislative agendas. 45
Given the right's grounding in the principle that those who govern owe some
duty to the governed, it is not surprising that petitioning's development is linked
to the development of popular sovereignty both in England and the American
colonies. 46 While originally based upon the mutual obligations between the
divine authority of the King and those he governed, grounded in the principles
of natural hierarchy and deference to higher authority, petitioning evolved with
the emergence ofpopular sovereignty.47 Madison described petitioning's role in
the American Constitutional order as recognizing that "[t]he people may
therefore publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them, or
declare their sentiment by petition to the whole body; in all these ways they may
communicate theirwill.,,48 Consequently, in the United States, petitions were no

42. Id. at 2169.
43. Id.
44. ld. at 2182 (citations omitted).
45 . See Higginson, supra note 18, at 142·54.
46. See Smith, supra note 18, at 1180·81.
47. See generally EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING TIm PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA (1988) (discussing the history of popular sovereignty in
England and the United States).
48. Smith, supra note 18, at 1182 (quoting I ANNALS OF CONGo 738 (Joseph Gales ed.,
1789)).

394

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:385

longer "the prayers of supplicants, but the missives 'of a free people [to] their
servants. ",49
Supplementing the affirmative right to command government attention was
the necessary corollary of the right-immunity from government prosecution.
Beginning with the English petition in 1013 to Aethelred the Unready who
promised not to retaliate against the petitioners, freedom from punishment has
been one of the "central features of the history of petitioning.,,50 If the right to
ask government to redress grievances, including grievances against the
government, was to have any meaning, those exercising that right had to be
immune from prosecution particularly for crimes against the state such as treason
and sedition.
While the history of petitioning records instances in both England and the
United States in which petitioners were in fact prosecuted for petitioning,
ultimately, those punished were generally released and their prosecution only
served to provide greater recognition for the right. 51 For example, in the Case of
the Seven Bishops, the bishops petitioned James II asking to be relieved from his
declaration that they read the Liberty of Conscience during their services, and
were prosecuted for seditious libel. Not only were the bishops ultimately
acquitted after their counsel argued that subjects have the right to petition the
King, their prosecution "led directly to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and to .
the Bill of Rights that fully confirmed the right of petition as an element of the
British constitution [sic]. ,,52
Similarly, in the United States, of the seventeen cases prosecuted under the
Alien and Sedition laws only one involved petitioning activity.53 Jedediah Peck
was indicted under the Sedition Acf4 for circulating a petition to Congress
advocating the repeal of the Alien and Sedition laws. Crowds of supporters not
only cheered for him upon his arrest, public demonstrations-and pressure led the
prosecution to drop the case. 55 Following Peck's case, no other petitioners were
indicted for challenging the constitutionality ofthose laws. 56 In contrast, Thomas

49. Mark, supra note 18, at 2205 (quoting Philadelphiensis, No. 5, reprinted in 3 TH E
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 116 (Herbert 1. Storing ed., 1981».
50. Smith, supra note 18, at 1154-55.
51. See jd. at 1162-66, 1175-77.
52. Id. at 1160-61.
53 . See jd. at 1176.
54. The Sedition Act
[M]ade it a crime, punishable by a $5000 fine and five years in prison, if any person
shall write, print, utter or publish ... any false, scandalous and malicious writing or
writings against the government of the United States, or either house of the Congress
., or the President ..., with intent to defame .. . or to bring them, or either of them,
into contempt or disrepute; or to excite against them, or either or any of them, the hatred
of the good people of the United States.
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-74 (1964) (quoting 1 Stat. 596 (1798».
55 . See Smith, supra note 18, at 1176.
56. See jd. at 1177.
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Jefferson had to issue a presidential pardon for those convicted based upon their
speech,57 and it was almost 200 years before the United States Supreme Court
explicitly recognized that the Sedition laws violated principles offree speech.58
Therefore, even during eras and regimes in which speech was prosecuted and the
press thoroughly regulated, petitioning was afforded significantly greater
protection. 59 Consequently, the classical right to petition operated both as a
sword to invoke public power and a shield to protect against government
prosecution.
3. The Historical Limits.-Even classical petitioning, however, was not
without its limits. Because the classical right to petition imposed upon
government formal obligations to hear the petition and refrain from prosecuting
the petitioners, petitions had to be differentiated from other forms of
communication. As Professor Mark has noted:
A petition was the beginning of an official action, part of a "course of
justice," not just a passing of information, even though the conveying of
information to the proper authority was a powerful justification for
petitions. Just as a claim brought in court required submission in a
certain manner, so did a complaint brought by petition, even if the forms
required ofpetitioners never quite equalled [sic] in puncti I iousness those
required of plaintiffs at common law. 60
As developed in English law, therefore, "[a] petition was a communication that,
1) had to be addressed to an authority such as the King, 2) had to state a
grievance, and, 3) had to pray for relief.,,61 Petitions had to have "petitionary
parts,,62 and had to be signed by those "legitimately allowed to request a redress
of grievances.,,63 Parliament also placed limits on the number of signatures that
could appear on a petition and on the number of individuals allowed to present
it. 64 According to Blackstone, these restrictions were justified "as a means of
avoiding riots or disruptive presentation of petitions.'>65
The English were not the only ones to place restrictions on the right to
petition; the American colonies also placed limited restrictions upon the right.
In colonial America, colonial assemblies adopted rules and regulations punishing

57. See New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 276.
58. See id. ("Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court, the attack upon its
validity has carried the day in the court of history.... These views reflect a broad consensus that
the Act, because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was
inconsistent with the First Amendment.").
59. See Smith, supra note 18, at 1168-69; Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 34-40.
60. Mark, supra note 18, at 2174 (citations omitted).
61. ld. at2173.
62. Id. at 2228 n.358.
63. Id. at 2220.
64. See Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 27.
65 . Id. at 26-27 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 138-39 (Univ. of
Chicago Press 1979»).
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the filing ofmeritless petitions. 66 Under these rules, the petitioner could be fined
and made to bear the cost of filing the meritless petition. 67 These limitations,
however, were not intended or applied to punish individuals based upon the
viewpoints expressed in the petitions. Instead, they were attempts to ensure "that
petitions with merit would be heard while individuals would be protected from
defending baseless actions.,,68 Despite these limitations, as the principal means
for criticizing government and seeking political change, the classical right to
petition was one of the most important rights of its time.

B. The Noerr Doctrine
In the context ofantitrust law, the development ofthe right to petition begins
with Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,69 in
which the Supreme Court considered whether the Sherman Act should be applied
to a publicity and lobbying effort conducted by twenty-four railroads to restrict
competition from the trucking industry.70 The railroads carried out their
campaign through deceptive and unethical ineans with the sole aim of pursuing
legislation that would destroy the trucking competition. 71 However, because "the
railroads were making a genuine effort to influence legislation and law
enforcement practices," the Court held that their conduct was absolutely immune
from antitrust liability.72
Writing for the Court, Justice Black emphasized that there is an "essential
dissimilarity" between agreements to petition for laws that would restrain trade
and private agreements that directly restrain trade, and that to condemn the
lobbying effort "would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not
business activity, but political activity, a purpose which would have no basis
whatever in the legislative history ofthat Act.,,73 A contrary conclusion "would
raise important constitutional questions,,,74 as the "right of petition is one of the
freedoms protected by the Bill ofRights, and we cannot, ofcourse, lightly impute
to Congress an intent to invade these freedoms .,,75
In reaching this conclusion the Court recognized the structural importance
ofthe right to petition. In a representative democracy, government represents the
will of the people. Ifthe people cannot make their wishes known to their agents,
especially when they seek changes to the existing legal order, government would

66.
67 .
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74 ,
75.

See id. at 3 1.
See id.
Id.
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
See id.
See id. at 129.
Id. at 144-45 .
Id. at 136-37.
Jd. at 138.
Id.
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no longer represent the people in their sovereign capacity.76 "In a representative
democracy such as this, these branches ofgovernment act on behalf ofthe people
and, to a very large extent, the whole concept ofrepresentation depends upon the
ability of the people to make their wishes known to their representatives.,>77
Punishing individuals for efforts to "influence the passage or enforcement of
laws" even by the deceptive publicity adopted by the railroads, therefore, would
be inconsistent with the principles of free government. 78
The Court, however, was unwilling to immunize any and all efforts to
influence government. The Court cautioned that "[t]here may be situations in
which a ... campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental
action, is a mere sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor and the
application of the Sherman Act would be justified.,,79 Widely known as the
"sham" exception, the Court's reservation has been the subject of extensive
discussion notably for the Court's failure, until recently, to provide any
additional guidance as to what sorts of activities fell within the exception. 80
In a series of decisions, following Noerr Motor Freight, the Supreme Court
extended immunity from antitrust liability to attempts to influence members of
the executive branch of government as well as the judiciary. In United Mine
Workers v. Pennington,8! the Court concluded that Noerr applied to the efforts
of large coal mine operators and the United Mine Workers to persuade the
Secretary of Labor to establish a higher minimum wage and convincing the
Tennessee Valley Authority to curtail certain market purchases in order to
eliminate smaller competitors. 82 The Court held that "moint efforts to influence
public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though intended to
eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either standing alone or as
part of a broader scheme violative of the Sherman Act. ,,83
Subsequently, in California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,84
the Court concluded that:

76. See id. at 137.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 140-41 ("[A] publicity campaign to influence governmental action falls clearly into
the category of political activity.").
79. Id. at 144 (emphasis added).
80. See, e.g., Robert P. Faulkner, The Foundations o~oerr-Pennington and the Burden of
Proving Sham Petitioning: The Historical-Constitutional Argument in Favor of a "Clear and
Convincing " Standard, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 681 (1994); Milton Handler & Richard A. De Sevo, The
Noerr Doctrine and Its Sham Exception, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 1 (1984); James B. Perrine, Comment,
Defining the "Sham Litigation" Exception to the Noerr-Pennington Antitrust Immunity Doctrine:
An AnalysiS ofthe Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries Decision, 46
ALA. L. REv. 815 (1995).
81. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
82. See id. at 660.
83. Id. at 670.
84. 404 U.S . 508 (1972).
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[I]t would be destructive of rights of association and of petition to hold
that groups with common interests may not, without violating the
antitrust laws, use the channels and procedures of state and federal
agencies and courts to advocate their causes and points of view
respecting resolution of their business and economic interests vis-a-vis
their competitors. 8s
"Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government.
The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of
petition.,,86 However, despite reaching that conclusion, the Court found that the
alleged conduct would fall outside Noerr protection under the "sham"
exception. 87 The controversy in California Motor Transport was between
intrastate and interstate trucking firms in which the interstate firms allegedly
conspired to oppose all applications filed by the intrastate firms for operating
rights before the California Public Utilities Commission or the Interstate
Commerce Commission. 88 According to the Court, "[A] pattern of baseless,
repetitive claims .. . effectively barring respondents from access to the agencies
and courts" would not qualify for immunity under the "umbrella of 'political
expression. ",89 .
Following its initial trilogy, the Court has taken some steps to define what
it meant by "sham." Based on the Supreme Court's decisions, the sham
exception became a catchall limit to petitioning immunity.90 Lack of a clear
definition led primarily to a split over the extent to which the petitioning party's
intent could form the basis for denying immunity.91 For example, Judge Posner
concluded that even lawsuits presenting colorable claims could constitute sham
conduct if the principal aim in bringing to suit was to burden competitors with
the cost of litigation regardless of the outcome of the case.92 In contrast, the
Sixth Circuit ruled that the "sham exception does not apply merely because a
party files a suit with the principle purpose of harming his competitor.,,93 In its
initial response, the Court made clear that private activity can only be considered
a sham if it is "not genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action."94

85. Id. at 510-11.
86. [d. at 510.
87. See id. at 511-12.
88. See id. at 509.
89. ld. at 5 13 .
90 . See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LA w~ 203. I a, at 19 (1996
Supp.) ("Some courts and commentators use it as a catchall for any activity that is not afforded
Noerr protection."); Handler & De Sevo, supra note 80 (employing expansive definition of sham).
91. See ALD, supra note 6, at 1002-05.
92. See Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 471-72 (7th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983).
93. Westmac, Inc. v. Smith, 797 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1035
( 1987).
94. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500 n.4 (1988).
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Subsequently, the Court finally provided a definitive definition for what
constitutes a "sham" in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia
Pictures Industries, Inc. 95 The Court adopted a two-part test:
First, the lawsuit must be objectively baseless in the sense that no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits. Ifan
objective litigant could conclude that the suit is reasonably calculated to
elicit a favorable outcome, the suit is immunized under Noerr, and an
antitrust claim premised on the sham exception must fail. Only if
challenged litigation is objectively meritless maya court examine the
litigant's subjective motivation. Under this second part ofour definition
ofsham, the court should focus on whether the baseless lawsuit conceals
"an attempt to interfere directly with the business relationships of a
competitor" ... through the "use [of] governmental process-as opposed
to the outcome ofthat process-as an anticompetitive weapon. 96
Accordingly, the Supreme Court clarified that Noerr immunity protects all
objectively reasonable acts of petitioning government regardless of intent.
Lastly, in addition to protecting the "act" of petitioning itself, courts
recognize that Noerr immunity protects what can be described as "incidental"
acts associated with "a valid effort to influence governmental action.,,97 For
example, the Supreme Court in Noerr Motor Freight concluded that even the
deceptive advertising aimed at the public could not form the basis for antitrust
liability because it was "incidental" to a valid effort to solicit government
action. 98 Along these lines, in the context oflitigation, courts have held that the
decision not to settle a law suit could not form an independent basis for antitrust
liability,99 nor could the publicity associated with a lawsuit. 100
The application of petitioning immunity to all three branches ofgovernment
is consistent with the classical right to petition. 101 As discussed above, one ofthe
primary protections offered by the right to petition was immunity from formal

95. 508 u.s. 49 (1993).
96. ld. at 60-61 (citations omitted).
97. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 499.
98. ld. at 505.
99. See Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc., 944 F.2d
1525, 1528-29 (9th Cir. 1991).
100. See Aircapital Cablevision, Inc. v. Starlink Communications Group, 634 F. Supp. 316,
324 (D. Kansas 1986) (holding that publicity associated with an antitrust lawsuit could not form
the basis for antitrust liability).
101. But see McGowan & Lemley, supra note 9, at 384-89 (arguing that the right to petition
should not apply to the courts). McGowan & Lemley's argument, however, overlooks the fact that
historically the right to petition was recognized as applying to the judiciary. Moreover, their
argument overlooks that functionally and occasionally in name as well, pleadings filed with courts
are the closest example of classical petitioning as they not only ask "government for the redress of
grievances" but they command its attention as well.
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efforts to invoke governmental power. 102 As petitions could be filed with the
King, legislatures, or courts, immunity followed in all three contexts.
Historically, the right was recognized by each of the branches as an effort to
draw more power unto themselves.103 Its modern day application is consistent
with the principle of popular sovereignty and that all three branches of
government are subordinate to and agents of the sovereign people. I04 This
conclusion is also consistent with the drafting of the First Amendment. The
original draft stated, "The people shall not be restrained ... from applying to the
legislatures by petitions, or remonstrances for redress of their grievances.,,105
The Senate rewrote the petition language with perhaps the most significant
change being the replacement of "Legislature" with "Government."I06 By
replacing legislature with government, Congress clearly intended that the right
should apply to all three branches. Consequently, the Supreme Court's
development of the right under Noerr is consistent with the right's Anglo
American history.
The Supreme Court's treatment of the right to petition does differ, however,
from the classical right in one important aspect: as the preceding decisions
demonstrate, the Court has extended immunity beyond the formal act of written
petitioning itself to what can be described as informal petitioning. 107 With the
exception of California Motor Transport in which the defendants had in fact .
filed formal "petitions" in the form of court documents,108 neither Noerr Motor
Freight nor Pennington involved formal written petitions to the governmental
bodies at issue. Instead, they dealt primarily with lobbying and other informal
avenues of political persuasion. In Noerr, for example, the primary conduct
immunized by the Court was a deceptive public relations campaign designed to

\02.
103.
104 .

See supra Part 1.A.2.
See Mark, supra note 18, at 2191; Higginson, supra note 18, at 150-53.
See generally MORGAN, supra note 47 (describing the differences in popular sovereignty
between England and the United States); Raymond Ku, Consensus of the Governed: The
LegjtimacyofConstitutional Change, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 535, 547-57 (1995)(discussing the role
of popular sovereignty in creating a Constitutional scheme of government). See also Smith, supra
note 18, at 1177 (noting that Madison critiqued the Alien and Sedition laws as "retreating toward
the exploded doctrine that the administrators ofthe Government are the masters and not the servants
of the people") (citation omitted).
105. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA 1789-1791 , at 10,16 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit eds., 1986).
106. See Smith supra note 18, at 1175; Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 40.
107. The extension of petitioning immunity to encompass informal acts of petitioning is in
part responsible for the doctrinal confusion surrounding Noerr. Ifthe court had concluded that the
right to petition protected only the formal act of submitting a classical petition, it would be a simple
matter to determine whether the right was implicated or not. By also protecting informal acts, it is
now necessary to come up with a means to distinguish between informal acts of petitioning and
other non-protected conduct. To date, the Court has failed to clearly articulate a method for making
such a determination.
108. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,511 (1972).
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influence Pennsylvania's Governor, Legislature, and people,l09 while, in
Pennington, the immunized conduct was the lobbying of the Secretary of Labor
and the Tennessee Valley Authority.IJO More recently, the Court has recognized
that even letters to the President of the United States could be considered
protected under the right to petition. II I However, according to Justice Douglas,
the right "is not limited to writing a letter or sending a telegram to a
congressman; it is not confined to appearing before the local city council, or
writing letters to the President or Governor or Mayor.,,112
This extension of petitioning immunity beyond formal acts of petitioning is
consistent with the adoption of the First Amendment. For example, James
Madison, who is often considered one of the principal architects behind the
petitioning clause of the First Amendment, 113 noted in the debates over whether
the people should have a right to instruct their representatives that "[t]he people
may [instead] publicly address their representatives, may privately advise them,
or declare their sentiment by petitions to the whole body; in all these ways they
may communicate their will.,,114 In this statement, Madison explicitly recognized
that the people's right extended beyond formal petitioning to informal acts such
as publicly addressing them or privately advising them.
The protection of informal acts of petitioning is also consistent with current
State recognition ofpetitioning. For example, a growing num ber ofstates protect
individuals from SLAPP suits (Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation). 115 SLAPP suits are lawsuits brought in retaliation for the
defendant's attempt to influence governmental action by, for example, testifying
at a public hearing to have property rezoned to the disadvantage of the
plaintiff. 116 As such they clearly implicate the right to petition as efforts to
punish individuals for exercising that right. 117 The legislative response to such

109. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 130
33 (1961).
110. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 659-60 (1965).
II J. See McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 484 (1985).
112. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 50 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
113 . See Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 39-40; Higginson, supra note 18, at 155-56.
114. Smith, supra note 18, at 1182(quoting 1 ANNALSOFCONG. 738(1789» .
115. See Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Studying Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation: Mixing Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches, 22 L. & SOC'y REv. 385 (1988)
(coining the term SLAPP suits); Aaron R. Gary, First Amendment Petition Clause Immunity from
Tort Suits: In Search ofa Consistent Doctrinal Framework, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 67, 131 (1996)
(noting that SLAPP suits are a growing public concern). Currently, eight states have statutes
protecting individuals from SLAPP suits. See generally LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE CENTER, 50
STATE SURVEY 1998-99: MEDIA PRIVACY AND RELATED LAW (1998).
116. See Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523, 524-25 (N .D. Ill. 1990) ("A
SLAPP suit is one filed by developers, unhappy with public protest over a propose development,
filed against leading critics in order to silence criticism of the proposed development.").
117. See id. at 526 (holding that defendant in SLAPP suit was immune from liability under
the right to petition).
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suits is typically to establish a procedure for the early dismissal of such suits and
for the imposition of costs upon the plaintiff. 118 In defining the exercise of the
right to petition, Massachusetts, for example, includes:
[A]ny written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any
written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or
any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely to
encourage consideration or review ofan issue by a legislative, executive,
or judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; any statement
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such
consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional
protection of the right to petition govemment. 119
The need to protect informal acts of petitioning is, therefore, recognized by the
States as well.
The protection of informal acts ofpetitioning, however, is in part responsible
for the confusion surrounding the current attitude towards petitioning because it
blurs the line between petitioning and speech. As discussed above, when the
right to petition has been invoked by the Supreme Court, more often than not it .
is in the same breath as freedom of speech. 120 In fact, the Court has stated that
"[t]he right to petition is cut from the same cloth as the other guarantees ofthat
Amendment, and is an assurance of a particular freedom ofexpression.,,121 This
confusion is understandable because some types of publicity and public relations
campaigns are considered "petitioning" and not simply speech.122 Moreover, it
is also understandable given that the right to petition is no longer the only
protected avenue for seeking political change or criticizing government. The
First Amendment now guarantees a wider range of freedom of expression than
was recognized during petitioning's golden era. Likewise, the rise of popular

118. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS. ch. 231, § 59h (West. Supp. 1999).
In any case in which a party asserts that the civil claims, counterclaims, or cross claims
against said party are based on said party's exercise of its right of petition under the
constitution ofthe United States or ofthe commonwealth, said party may bring a special
motion to dismiss. The court shall advance any such special motion so that it may be
heard and determined as expeditiously as possible. The court shall grant such special
motion, unless the party against whom such special motion is made shows that: (I) that
the moving party's exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual
support or any arguable basis in law and (2) that the moving party's acts caused actual
injury to the responding party ...
fd.

119.
120.
121.
122.
immunity

fd.
See Rydstrom, supra note 18.
McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 482 (1985).
But see Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 66 (arguing that the extension of petitioning
to such efforts is overinclusive).
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sovereignty and universal suffrage broadened the accepted means for political
participation. The extension of these other rights, however, should not obscure
petitioning's continued importance. The right to petition remains the principal
textual guarantee ofthe individual's right directly to seek government action and
for immunity from prosecution for those efforts.

C. The Problem
Against this backdrop, an argument could be made that parties involved in
an objectively reasonable lawsuit who enter into a settlement agreement with
anticompetitive consequences, are nonetheless, immune because the agreement
is incidental to their Constitutionally protected right to petition the government
for redress. In making this argument, litigants would find support in the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc.123 In that case, the court held that "[a] decision to accept
or reject an offer of settlement is conduct incidental to the prosecution ofthe suit
and not a separate and distinct activity which might form the basis for antitrust
liability.,,124 So long as the litigation itself is not a sham and entitled to
immunity, any settlement would likewise be immune.
Second, litigants could point to the fact that, as a general rule, the antitrust
laws do not preclude settlement by agreement rather than by litigation,125 and
emphasize the "general policy favoring settlement of litigation.,,126 Lastly, at
least one commentator has argued that "[t]oo great a willingness to find antitrust
violations in settlement arrangements would significantly inhibit settlements of
many types of cases at real cost to the administration of justice, with little
I ikel ihood ofany countervai Iing benefit to the pub I ic interest."127 In other words,
denying immunity in the context of settlements would impose significant costs
upon society either through the increased transaction costs associated with
litigation or by limiting the ability of private actors to order their affairs. Despite
the facial plausibility of this argument, a more probing examination of the right
to petition reveals that the settlement of litigation is not the sort of activity that
the right protects.

II.

DEFINrNG THE SCOPE OF PETITIONrNG IMMUNITY

In order to determine whether the settlement of litigation is an activity that
falls outside the protection of the First Amendment's right to petition, an
understanding of the scope and limits of petitioning immunity is necessary.
However, as noted by numerous commentators, this area of law is replete with

123. 944 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1991).
124. ld. at 1528.
125. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 (1931).
126. United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 199 (1963) (White, J., concurring);
Dore, supra note 16, at 290-91 . But see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlements, 93 YALE L.J. 1073
(\ 984) (criticizing the movement towards alternative dispute resolution).
127. Reasoner & Adler, supra note 8, at 126.
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"doctrinal confusion,,128 as a result of the Supreme Court's "failure to set forth
clear general rules for defining the scope of the immunity.,,129 Currently, the
clearest guidance provided by the Court is that the scope of Noerr immunity
depends upon "the source, context, and nature ofthe anticompetitive restraint at
issue.,,13o In dissent, Justice White noted that under this rule, "[D]istrict courts
and courts of appeals will be obliged to puzzle over claims raised under the
doctrine without any intelligible guidance about when and why to apply it."I3!
To flesh out this rule, this section examines the underlying premises ofthe Noerr
doctrine and articulates some general rules and a methodology for determining
the scope of petitioning immunity.
Despite the general ambiguity surrounding Noerr, the history of the right to
petition and the Supreme Court's case law demonstrate that immunity is justified
based upon the nature of the activity in question and the source of the injury to
competition. This Article proposes that immunity attaches when:

1) the conduct represents valid petitioning. Valid petitioning is defined
as a formal or informal attempt to persuade an independent governmental
decision maker consistent with the rules of the political forum in
question, and
2) any anticompetitive harms flow directly or indirectly from those
persuasive efforts.
Under this means/source test, the Supreme Court recognizes that: I) individuals
have a constitutional right to petition government for any end, and 2) the antitrust
laws do not apply when restraints upon trade are a) the result of government
action, or b) result directly from the act of petitioning. 132 Immunity under Noerr
is justified in circumstances in which both of prongs ofthe means/source test are
satisfied. 133 Moreover, if these requirements are not satisfied, conduct is not
immune even if "genuinely aimed at procuring favorable government action,,134
and therefore not a sham.135

128. E.g., McGowan & Lemley, supra note 9, at 298.
129. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1178.
130. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S . 492, 499 (1988).
131. Id. at 513 (White, 1., dissenting).
132. See discussion infra Part ILA & Part II.B.
133 . See discussion infra Part ILA & Part II.B.
134. Allied Tube, 486 U.S. at 500 n.4. Additionally, Noerr immunity is based implicitly on
at least two assumptions. First, the process in which the anticompetitive result is being advocated
is open to all sides. Second and closely related to the first, the outcome ofthe alleged ly immunized
activity must be subject to revision and reconsideration. Both of these assumptions are closely
rooted to the political nature of the right. Harm to competition cannot be legitimately attributed to
government, if those who are injured or simply oppose the "harm" do not have an avenue for being
heard , and government cannot subsequently alter the outcome if it is inconsistent with the public
good or any other reason.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 142-45.
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A. TheMeans
Logically, the first step in determining whether the challenged activity is
insulated under the First Amendment's right to petition is to determine whether
the activity can be considered protected petitioning. '36 Historically, this would
have meant a formal act of submitting a petition to a governmental body, in the
appropriately deferential tone, seeking the redress of some public or private
issue, separate from the cognate acts ofspeech and assembly. 137 However, as the
prior summary of the Supreme Court's original trilogy in this area reveals, the
Court has recognized that petitioning encompasses other means of
communication in addition to the formal act of petitioning in the 18th century
sense. 138 The right to petition extends to all valid efforts to solicit "governmental
action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws" whether they be
formal or informal. 139 The threshold inquiry under Noerr, therefore, requires a
determination that the private conduct represents an effort to solicit government
action and that the means employed are considered valid. '40
Atthe outset it should be noted that determining whether the means are valid
and therefore protected petitioning is not necessarily equivalent to determining
whether the motives are genuine. If private action is not genuinely aimed at
soliciting governmental action, it is considered a sham, and therefore unprotected
by the First Amendment even if the means utilized would otherwise be
considered valid for purposes of petitioning. 141 Correspondingly, however, a
genuine motive to "procure favorable governmental action" will not insulate
private action if the means employed are not protected. As the Supreme Court
made clear in Allied Tube and Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court

136. Some commentators and courts have treated this question as a determination into
whether the conduct in question is a sham. See, e.g., AREEDA&HOVENKAMP,supra note 90, at 19
("Some courts and commentators use [sham] as a catchall for any activity that is not afforded Noerr
protection."); Minda, supra note 10, at 1013-15 (arguing for the sham exception to include methods
that distort the deliberative process of government). However, as discussed earlier, sham conduct
has been narrowly defined to circumstances in which the private actor does not genuinely intend
to secure governmental assistance. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. Accordingly,
the sham category is both over inclusive and underinclusive. Moreover, it fails to provide any
substantive guidance into what activities should be protected under the First Amendment.
137. See supra Part 1.A; see also Mark, supra note 18, at 2170-74.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 107-19.
139. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138
(1961).
140. See Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1215-23 (noting the need to determine whether the
restraint is incidental and valid) (relying upon Allied Tube).
141. See Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 508 U.S. 49,
60 (1992) (defining sham); Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indiana Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 500
n.4 (1988).
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Trial Lawyers Ass 'n, 142 protection under the right to petition may be denied even
if the conduct in question was, in fact, intended and successfully results in
government action. 14J
But what exactly is protected petitioning? What means for soliciting
government action are valid? As the following discussion demonstrates, the
method for determining whether private conduct represents valid petitioning is
a two step process. First, courts must determine the "nature" of the conduct in
question-is the conduct primarily an effort to persuade an independent
governmental decision-maker? If so, the next step is to determine whether that
conduct is otherwise permissible within the rules of the political arena in which
the petitioning is occurring without reference to antitrust. 144 Specific conduct
that is considered acceptable varies depending upon whether the legislative,
executive, or judicial branches are involved. Therefore, as the Supreme Court
has recognized, context is crucial. A detailed analysis ofcases from the Supreme
Court's original trilogy as well as subsequent cases brings this initial two part
inquiry into sharper focus.
1. Is the Petitioning Valid?-As discussed earlier, the Noerr Motor Freight
decision examined the struggle between railroads and the heavy trucking
industry. The trucking industry contended that the railroads conspired "to
conduct a pUblicity campaign against the truckers designed to foster the adoption
and retention of laws and law enforcement practices destructive of the trucking
business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general
public, and to impair the relationships existing between the truckers and their
customers.,,145 The complaint alleged that this campaign was conducted through
unethical and fraudulent means including the circulation of material which
appeared to be spontaneously expressed views of independent persons and
groups when, in fact, they were produced by and for the railroads. '46 The
truckers claimed that, as a result of this conduct, they sustained damages in the
form of lost revenue when the Governor of Pennsylvania vetoed legislation
favorable to trucking and by incurring costs in responding to the publicity
effort.147 In response, the railroad counter-claimed, among other things, that the
truckers engaged in similar publicity and through similarly unethical and
fraudulent means. 148 Despite finding that both sides had engaged in similarly
deceptive publicity, the trial court found for the truckers and against the rai Iroad
based upon evidence that the railroads intended to harm trucking while the
truckers were merely seeking self-serving legislation. '49
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In finding the railroads' conduct immunized from antitrust scrutiny, the Court
began with the proposition that "no violation of the [Sherman] Act can be
predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of
laws.,,15o The Court noted that:
In a representative democracy such as this, [the] branches ofgovernment
act on behalf ofthe people and, to a very large extent, the whole concept
of representation depends upon the ability of the people to make their
wishes known to their representatives. To hold that the government
retains the power to act in this representative capacity and yet hold, at
the same time, that the people cannot freely inform the government of
their wishes would impute to the Sherman Act a purpose to regulate, not
business activity, but political activity .... 151
Accordingly, with due consideration for the right to petition, the Court held that
"activities [which] comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with
respect to the passage and enforcement oflaws" would be immune from antitrust
scrutiny.152 Because there was no question in Noerr that the "nature" of the
railroads' activities, the publicity campaign, was in fact an effort to influence
governmental decision-making (an effort that was at least in part a successful),
the Court was not confronted with whether petitioning was involved. As the
Court noted in its subsequent decision in Pennington, the evidence in Noerr
Motor Freight consisted "entirely of activities of competitors seeking to
influence public officials.,,153 However, that did not end the inquiry, and the
decision went on to address whether the intent behind the petition and the means
employed were "sufficient to take the case out of the area in which the principle
is controlling.,,154
First, the Court rejected the district court's conclusion that the railroads '
purpose ofseeking to destroy their competition through legislation was somehow
impermissible. According to the Court:
The right ofthe people to inform their representatives in government of
their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of hiws cannot
properly be made to depend upon their intent in doing so. It is neither
unusual or illegal for people to seek action on laws in the hope that they
may bring about an advantage to themselves and a disadvantage to their
competitors. 155
This passage is important because the Court found that no rules or laws outside
of antitrust prohibited petitioning based upon the intent of the petition, and
therefore, a "bad motive" would not be sufficient to remove immunity for the
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railroads' petitioning activity.ls6
Next, the Court went on to reject the contention that the "deception"
involved in the publicity campaign was sufficient to subject the conduct to
antitrust scrutiny. While the Court found the practices to fall "far short of the
ethical standards generally approved in this country," the technique employed by
the railroads (and the trucking industry) was apparently "in widespread use
among practitioners of the art of public relations" at the time. ls7 Once again, in
the absence of any rule prohibiting the use of the so called "third-party
technique," the Shennan Act could not prohibit such conduct. To use the Court's
language, "Insofar as that Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is a code that
condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and, as we have already pointed
out, a publicity campaign to influence governmental action falls clearly into the
. category of political activity."ls8 Accordingly, beginning with Noerr, the Court
examined both whether the conduct in question could be considered petitioning,
and if so whether the petitioning activity was consistent with the rules of the
"political arena" in which it occurred.
Following Noerr, the Court next examined the means of petitioning in two
cases involving the judicial arena: Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food
Machinery & Chemical Corp. 159 and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited. l60 Unfortunately, neither opinion is very detailed, and both fail to .
provide a coherent explanation for why petitioning immunity was denied in each
instance. Nonetheless, both decisions can be readily explained by the fact that
the petitioning conduct, the filing of a lawsuit, violated rules and norms within
the judicial arena without reference to antitrust laws.
Rather than concluding that the truckers' litigation efforts were a sham,
California Motor Transport is better understood as recognizing that while their
conduct represented petitioning, it was invalid petitioning under the rules
governing adjudication. As discussed earlier, California Motor Transport,
involved allegations that certain trucking companies had violated the Clayton Act
by conspiring to "institute state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat
applications" by their competitors to acquire competing trucking rights.161 In that
decision, the Supreme Court made clear that access to courts and administrative
agencies were clearly protected by the right to petition. 162 Despite that
conclusion, the Court nonetheless found against the interstate truckers for filing
their claims against the intrastate truckers even though they had a "right ofaccess
to the agencies and courts to be heard on applications sought by competitive

156. In so doing, the Court also appears to imply that even if such a rule did exist it would
impermissibly interfere with the right to petition. See id.
157 . Id. at 140.
158. Id. at 140-41.
159. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
160. 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
161. Id. at 509.
162. See id. at 510.
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highway carriers.,,163
Nominally, the Court concluded that because the complaint alleged that the
interstate truckers instituted proceedings "with or without probable cause, and
regardless of the merits of the cases,,,I64 the alleged conduct fell within the sham
exception. The Supreme Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the
truckers had been successful in the majority of their challenges winning twenty
one out of forty cases. 165 Given the defendant's successes, as Professor Elhauge
observed, "[I]t could not be denied that the suits were genuine efforts to
influence adjudicators."I66 Nor could it be argued that the claims raised were
objectively without merit as required under the Supreme Court's most recent
definition of sham. 167 Accordingly, the conduct in California Motor does not
satisfY the doctrinal definition of sham as it is understood today.
California Motor can best be understood as concluding that whi Ie the means
used by the defendants were unquestionably petitioning, as alleged they could
nonetheless be considered invalid under the rules of administrative and judicial
proceedings. In an effort to distinguish the fact that in Noerr the railroads used
deception, misrepresentation, and unethical tactics to secure favorable
legislation, the Court emphasized the context of the activity at issue. While
unethical conduct may be permitted in the political arena, "unethical conduct in
the setting of the adjudicatory process often results in sanctions.,,168 For
example, "[m]isrepresentations, condoned in the political arena, are not
immunized when used in the adjudicatory process.,,169 While California Motor
did not involve perjury or other misrepresentations, it potentially involved the
common law tort of abuse of process which would be impermissible without
reference to antitrust laws or principles. 170 Because conduct such as perjury,
fraud, and abuse of process are prohibited in the judicial arena, they "cannot
acquire immunity by seeking refuge under the umbrella of 'political
expression. ",171 In other words, conduct inconsistent with the rules governing
adjudicative proceedings would not be considered valid or protected petitioning
activity.
Similarly in Walker Process, the Supreme Court examined whether the
maintenance and enforcement of a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office
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could form the basis for a Sherman Act violation. 172 In finding that the antitrust
claim could proceed, the Court relied upon a well established body of patent law
involving the invalidity of patents procured by fraud which recognizes that the
validity of patents is always subject to attack.173 "The far-reaching social and
economic consequences of a patent ... give the public a paramount interest in
seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other
inequitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their legitimate
scope.,,174 Consequently, the Court concluded that if the plaintiff, Food
Machinery, obtained its patent by knowingly and willfully misrepresenting facts
to the Patent Office, it would not be immune from the antitrust laws. 175 "By the
same token, Food Machinery's good faith would furnish a complete defense.,,176
In the former case, a plaintiff knows or should know that the patent is invalid as
a matter of law and, therefore, subsequent efforts to maintain and enforce that
patent against others would have no objective legal basis. While some may label
this conduct a sham 177 because the plaintiff would certainly be seeking
government action in its favor (Le., the enforcement of the patent against a
competitor), denial of immunity is better understood as based upon the
unprotected status of the alleged petitioning conduct. Accordingly, even though
the Court's decision does not even mention Noerr, its conclusion is consistent
with the principle that petitioning immunity only attaches when the petitioning ·
conduct is considered valid.
Outside the context of antitrust, the Supreme Court's decision in McDonald
v. Smith l78 is also consistent with examining whether the challenged petitioning
conduct was considered valid. The defendant in McDonald sent letters to
President Reagan, Presidential Advisor Edwin Meese, Senator Jesse Helms, and
other public officials opposing the plaintiffs consideration for the position of
United States Attomey.179 The letters accused the plaintiff of violating the civil
rights of individuals while serving as a state court judge, committing fraud ,
conspiring to commit fraud, extortion and blackmail, and other violations of
professional ethics. 180 Following the rejection of his nomination, the plaintiff
sued for I ibel. 181
On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the
statements made in the defendant's letters should be entitled to absolute

172. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chern. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 173 (\965).
173. See id at 176-77.
J 74. Id at 177 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)).
175. See id
176. Id
177. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, ~ 204.1, at 74-76; Minda, supra note 10,
at 971-72.
178. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
179. Seeidat481.
180. See id
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immunity or subject to the qualified immunity afforded by the constitutional
malice standard recognized in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 182 In determining
the scope of immunity to be afforded to the defendant's petitioning efforts, the
Court began by noting the historical significance of the right and that it "is
implicit in' [t]he very idea ofgovernment, repUblican in form. ",183 The historical
importance of the right, however, was not dispositive. 184 Instead, the Court
examined whether the common law ofdefamation recognized absolute immunity
for letters to public officials, noting that the authorities on that subject were
mixed and that it had rejected a claim for absolute immunity in a prior
defamation decision. 185 In light of this case law, the Court concluded that
absolute immunity was not justified, and that the statements made in the letters
could lead to liability if the plaintiff satisfied the New York Times standard and
demonstrated that they were made with knowing or reckless disregard for the
truth. 186 In support of its conclusion that some limitations on petitioning are
legitimate, the Court relied on its "decisions interpreting the Petition Clause in
contexts other than defamation" including California Motor Transport which did
not "indicate that the right to petition is absolute.,,18?
2. Is the Conduct Petitioning?-In the preceding cases the nature of the
private conduct was admittedly petitioning activity: lobbying, a publicity
campaign directed at public officials, the filing of lawsuits, and instituting
administrative proceedings. The question, therefore, was whether those
petitioning activities were conducted in accordance with the rules and procedures
of the petitioning forum, and, therefore, valid. In the following two cases, the
Supreme Court confronted which types of conduct could in fact be considered
petitioning, let alone valid petitioning.
In Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc.,188 manufacturers of
steel conduits used to house electrical wiring conspired with other steel interests
to exclude plastic conduits from the National Electric Code. The Code,
published by the National Fire Protection Association (a private organization
representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized medicine, firefighters,
and government), establishes product and performance requirements for
electrical wiring. 189 State and local governments routinely adopted the Code with

182. See id. at 481-82.
183 . Id. at 482-83 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876)).
184. See id. at 483 ("Although the values in the right of petition as an important aspect of
self-government are beyond question, it does not follow that the Framers of the First Amendment
believed that the Petition Clause provided absolute immunity from damages for libeL").
185 . See id. at 483-84. But see Smith, supra note 18, at 1183 (arguing that the Supreme
Court's analysis was flawed and that common law did recognize absolute immunity for letters to
public officials); Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 52-58 (same).
186. See id. at 485 ("The right to petition is guaranteed; the right to commit libel with
impunity is not.").
187. Id. at 484 .
188
486 U.S. 492, 497 (1988).
189. See id. at 495.
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little or no revisions, and private industry often required electrical products to be
consistent with the Code. 190
The controversy began when manufacturers of plastic conduits sought to
have their conduits included as an approved type ofelectrical conduit in the 1981
edition of the Code. As described by the Supreme Court:
Alarmed that, if approved, respondent's product might pose a
competitive threat to steel conduit, petitioner, the Nation's largest
producer of steel conduit, met to plan strategy with, among others,
members ofthe steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and its
independent sales agents. They collectively agreed to exclude
respondent's product from the 1981 Code by packing the upcoming
annual meeting with new Association members whose only function
would be to vote against the [plastic conduit] proposal. 191
To that end, they recruited 230 persons to join the Association and paid over
$100,000 in expenses for these recruits. The strategy was successful and, while
unethical, apparently was not prohibited by the Association's rules.192 Allied
Tube subsequently brought an antitrust action seeking damages for injuries
resulting from the exclusion ofplastic conduits by the Code itself, but not for any
injuries stemming from the adoption of the Code by governmental entities.193
Beginning with the now accepted proposition that "[c]oncerted efforts to
restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning government officials are protected
from antitrust liability," Justice Brerinan, writing for the Court, stated that the
"scope of this protection depends, however, on the source, context, and nature
ofthe anticompetitive restraint at issue.,,194 Because Allied Tube was not seeking
damages for the governmental adoption of the Code, any injury to competition
arose from private action as opposed to governmental action. Under those
circumstances, the Court stated that "the restraint cannot form the basis for
antitrust liability ifit is 'incidental' to a valid effort to influence governmental
action. The validity of such efforts, and thus the applicability of Noerr
immunity, varies with the context and nature ofthe activity." 195 The central issue
in Allied Tube, therefore, was whether the defendant's conduct represented
petitioning-a valid effort to influence governmental action.
For the purposes of its analysis, the Court accepted. the defendant's
arguments that efforts to influence the Association's standards-setting process
represented the most effective means of influencing legislation and that any
effect the Code had in the marketplace of its own force was, in general, incidental
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to a genuine effort to influence governmental action. 196 As such, there was no
issue that the defendant was not genuinely attempting to influence government.
Accepting these arguments, however, did not end the inquiry. According to the
Court:
We cannot agree with [the] absolutist position that the Noerr doctrine
immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence
governmental action. If all such conduct were immunized then, for
example, competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price
agreements as long as they wished to propose that price as an appropriate
level for governmental ratemaking or price supports. . .. Horizontal
conspiracies or boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other
economic advantages from the government would be immunized on the
ground that they are genuinely intended to influence the government to
agree to the conspirators' terrns. 197
The method in which the defendant attempted to influence government,
therefore, was critical in determining whether petitioning immunity would be
recognized.
Given the context and nature ofthe activities, the Court ultimately concluded
that Noerr immunity did not apply. The Court stated that "[w]hat distinguishes
this case from Noerr and its progeny is that the context and nature of petitioner's
activity make it the type of commercial activity that has traditionally had its
validity determined by the antitrust laws themselves.,,198 In other words, the
private conduct in Allied Tube was not simply petitioning but, instead,
commercial conduct. First, the context of the conduct in question was the
standard-setting process of a private association which the courts have
traditionally examined because oftheir independent potential to restrain trade. 199
As the Court stated, an "agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly
an agreement not to manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of
products," and, therefore, a classic example ofa restraint upon trade. 2°O Because
the conduct occurs in a private forum in which the actors have economic
incentives to restrain trade, it is a far cry from an open political arena in which
divergent viewpoints may be heard. 201
Along those same lines, the nature of the activity at issue could not be
classified as an effort to persuade "an independent decision-maker." Instead, the
defendant "organized and orchestrated the actual exercise of the Association's
decision-making authority in setting the standard.,,202 The Association's rejection
of plastic conduits was not accomplished through debate and discussion on the
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merits. Rather, the steel industry packed the Association meeting with paid
agents whose only role was to vote against plaintiffs proposal. The steel
companies paid individuals to become members ofthe Association, paid for their
expenses, instructed them where to sit, and instructed them when to vote. 203
In reaching this conclusion, the Court emphasized that subjecting this type
of behavior to antitrust scrutiny in no way diminished the defendant's ability to
engage in actual petitioning against plastic conduits. According to the Court,
"[P]etitioner, and others concerned about the safety or competitive threat of
polyvinyl chloride conduit, can, with full antitrust immunity, engage in concerted
efforts to influence those governments through direct lobbying, publicity
campaigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression.,,204
Additionally, defendant could take advantage of the forum provided by the
association "by presenting and vigorously arguing accurate scientific evidence
before a nonpartisan private standard-setting body.,,205 While this latter approach
would not be immune from antitrust scrutiny, it might deflect antitrust liability
under the rule ofreason. 206
As a result, even though the defendant genuinely intended to influence
governmental action, was in fact successful in obtaining governmental action,
and accomplished its objectives without violating any rules of either the
Association or the legislative arena, the Court concluded that its activities were ·
not insulated from antitrust scrutiny. It did so because the defendant's conduct
did not represent petitioning. At best it could be characterized "as commercial
conduct with a political impact.,,207 At worst, it was a purely selfish economic
decision accomplished through the exercise of raw market power. Either way,
it was not protected by the right to petition .
Petitioning immunity also turned on the nature of the private conduct in
Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n.208 Once
again, the Court was confronted with the issue ofwhether the conduct in question
could be considered petitioning. In Superior Court, approximately 100 lawyers
who regularly represented indigent defendants in the District ofColumbia sought
an increase in the hourly rates paid under the District of Columbia Criminal
Justice Act (CJA).209 The CJA lawyers employed a three-fold strategy. First,
they prepared and signed a petition seeking an increase in the hourly wages;
second, they agreed to refuse any new CJA assignments until they received their
raise; and third, they arranged a series of events to publicize their plight. zlD As
a result of the collective decision to stop taking cases, the District's criminal
justice system was eventually overwhelmed, prompting the Mayor to agree to an
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increase in CJA rates as demanded. 211
In response, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a complaint against
the lawyers arguing that they had engaged in unfair methods of competition
through "a conspiracy to fix prices" and conducting a boycott.212 It should be
noted at the outset that the FTC did not claim that the formal act of petitioning
itself or the publicity efforts violated the antitrust laws. The Supreme Court
stated that "[i]t is, of course, clear that the association's efforts to publicize the
boycott, to explain the merits of its cause, and to lobby District officials to enact
favorable legislation ... were activities that were fully protected by the First
Amendment.,,213 Accordingly, the sole issue before the Court was whether the
boycott itself was protected by the First Amendment.
Although the boycott certainly represented an effort to influence government,
. the Supreme Court concluded that the boycott was not protected petitioning.
According to the Court, this issue was "largely disposed of' by Allied Tube, in
which the Court explained that Noerr does not protect every effort genuinely
intended to influence government. Otherwise, "[h]orizontal conspiracies or
boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from the
government would be immunized on the ground that they are genuinely intended
to influence the government to agree to the conspirators' terms.,,214 The CJA
boycott was a horizontal agreement among competitors that was unquestionably
"a 'naked restraint' on price and outpUt.,,215 As explained by the appellate court,
the constriction in price created by the boycott is the "essence of 'price-fixing,'
whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price, which will decrease the
quantity demanded, or by agreeing upon an output, which will increase the price
offered.,,216
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the boycott was protected
speech. Although the Court in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. 217 recognized
some First Amendment protection for boycotts seeking to vindicate constitutional
rights, it did so "[0 ]nly after recognizing the well settled validity of prohibitions
against various economic boycotts . . . .'>218 In general, the regulation of
economic boycotts only incidentally effects the rights of speech and association.
Accordingly, the government has "power to regulate [such] economic activity,"
especially when a clear objective of the boycott is economic gain for the
participants. 219 In the Court's view, the boycott represented econo~ic rather than
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political activity.
Another way to interpret Superior Court is to recognize that with the boycott,
the CJA attorneys had gone beyond merely attempting to persuade an
independent decision-maker. Instead of limiting their efforts to persuading the
District through the presentation of facts and arguments or through public
pressure, the attorneys used the boycott to economically coerce the government
into action. This distinction is made clear by Justice Brennan's opinion.220
According to Justice Brennan:
The Petition and Free Speech Clauses ofthe First Amendment guarantee
citizens the right to communicate with the government, and when a
group persuades the government to adopt a particular policy through the
force of its ideas and the power of its message, no antitrust liability can
attach. . .. But a group's effort to use market power to coerce the
government through economic means may subject the participants to
antitrust liability. 221
This distinction between persuasion and coercion is clearly consistent with the
historical origins ofthe right to petition. Historically, petitions were rejected by
the King and Parliament if their requests for government action were not
sufficiently deferential. 222 Ifa petition could be rejected because its request was
not sufficiently deferential, demands and coercion would certainly be refused.
Today, while the acceptance of popular sovereignty has changed the relationship
between the people and government, unless the people are acting in their
sovereign capacity, public questions are to be resolved by government through
a representative and deliberative process.223 Coercion, like the right to instruct
representatives, necessarily undermines the deliberative process. 224 Consequently
both Allied Tube and Superior Court stand for the proposition that while various
efforts to persuade an independent governmental decision maker are protected

220. Justice Brennan agreed with the majority that the boycott was not insulated from
antitrust scrutiny either as petitioning or speech. His disagreement with the Court was over whether
the conduct must necessarily lead to antitrust liability. See id. at 437 (Brennan, J. , concurring in
part and dissenting in part). In his opinion, although the expressive component of an economic
boycott did not render the boycott absolutely immune, it cautioned in favor of applying the rule of
reason to determine whether the boycott achieved its objective through political persuasion or
through market power. See id. at 446.
221. Id. at 437-38 .
222. See, e.g., Spanbauer, supra note 18, at 32 ("Early petitions presented by the colonies to
England were composed with respectful language and began with expressions of the petitioners'
subservience, loyalty, and support for the crown. Such petitions were the only authorized channel
through which criticism of the government was funneled.").
223. See Ku, supra note 104, at 557-76 (discussing when constitutional change can
legitimately claim to represent an act ofpopular sovereignty); CassoR. Sunstein, Naked Preferences
and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689 (1984) (arguing that law making must be based on
reasoned deliberation).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39.
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under the right to petition, efforts to dictate the result either directly through
market power or indirectly through governmental coercion will be subjected to
scrutiny.22s
The means analysis employed by the Supreme Court examines whether the
challenged conduct is in fact petitioning-an effort to persuade an independent
governmental decision-maker through the presentation of facts and arguments.
If the conduct is petitioning, a court must then determ ine whether that petitioning
is valid according to the rules and procedures of the forum in which the activity
occurs. This two-step examination ensures that the conduct in question does not
subvert the political process and governmental accountability. As Professor
E1hauge has noted, we allow private, financially interested actors to make
important decisions about resource allocation in the market because free
competition "causes producers to provide goods at the lowest cost to those who
value them the most.,,226 Under those circumstances, antitrust review ensures that
those private "actions conform to this competitive process rather than undermine
it to reap monopoly profits.,,227 In contrast, we allow government to determine
the public good even through restraints of trade because, in theory, its decision
making takes place in a political process with procedures that ensure that
government remains accountable to the people.228 By determining whether the
conduct represents persuasion rather than coercion and that the means employed
are consistent with the rules and norms of the governmental forum, the means
analysis protects both the individual's right to petition and governmental
accountability.229

B. The Source ofthe Antitrust Injury
In addition to the means employed, Noerr immunity depends upon the source

225. See also Wigwam Assocs., Inc. v. McBride, 24 Mass. Law. Wkly. S2 (Feb. 5, 1996)
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that the "badmouthing" ofa developer to prospective home buyers
fell outside the context of petitioning government).
226. Elhauge, supra note 9, at 1197-98.
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Professor Minda argues that the Noerr doctrine should be reconsidered in light of
interest group theory because ofthe potential for business interests to capture the political process.
See Minda, supra note 10, at 1027-28. Instead, he proposes that "courts should adopt a standard
and an understanding of the first amendment that carefully limits petitioning activity of business
when such activity is part of a profit-maximizing strategy for monopolizing markets, regardless of
context." Id. at 911 . The problem with this approach is that it places too much faith in the judicial
process and undervalues the role that petitioning and other political rights play in protecting against
the very evil that concerns Professor Minda-unresponsive government. Instead of relying upon
the political process to eliminate governmental capture, Professor Minda would rely upon judges
to determine when business has gone too far. However, this approach elevates the policies
embodied in antitrust laws to the level of constitutional law and overlooks the potential for judicial
capture.

418

INDIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:385

" Court has noted, there is a "dividing
ofthe harm to competition. As the Supreme
line between restraints resulting from governmental action and those resulting
from private action . . . ."230 Presumably, private actors can not be held
responsible for the former, while they are responsible for the latter. However,
this distinction between public versus private action unnecessarily clouds the
immunity analysis and provides an incomplete picture of petitioning immunity.
Arguably, any time petitioning conduct is challenged as a violation of law the
costs imposed upon competitors or other injuries to competition can be said to
originate from private conduct or the original petitioning activity. Independent
ofthe source of the ultimate restraint, the act of petitioning itself, whether it be
the filing of a formal petition, a lawsuit, informal lobbying, or a publicity
campaign, imposes costs on competition simply by requiring competitors to
respond.23I Yet, immunity for these types of "injuries" is required even though
they cannot be attributed to government. 232 Moreover, petitioning immunity
insulates private actors even when their petitioning efforts fail, and any resulting
restraint upon competition clearly cannot be attributed to government.233
Although the public/private distinction provides justification for immunity under
certain limited circumstances, it hardly explains when and why protection should
be granted in the vast majority of cases. Consequently, the question should not
be whether the restraint can be attributed to public versus private decision
making. Instead, the source prong should focus on determining whether the
restraint results from valid petitioning.
Unfortunately, the source ofthis doctrinal confusion stems from the Supreme
Court's decision in Noerr itself. In justifying immunity, the Court stated that
"where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid
governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be
made OUt.,,234 This conclusion was required because "under our form of
government the question whether a law of that kind should pass, or if passed be
enforced, is the responsibility of the appropriate legislative or executive branch
of government so long as the law itself does not violate some provision of the

230. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. , 486 U.S. 492, 501 (1988).
231. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, ,Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 143
44 (1961).
232. See id.
It is inevitable, whenever an attempt is made to influence legislation. . that an
incidental effect of that campaign may be the infliction of some direct injury upon the
interests of the party against whom the campaign is directed.... To hold that the
knowing infliction of such injury renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be
tantamount to outlawing alJ such campaigns.
ld.
233 . See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, ~ 201, at 16 ("Even if the proposed action
is rejected and a rival has been burdened by being forced to oppose the measure or defend himself
in a lawsuit, such a burden is the normal result of governmental processes and its imposition on a
rival is not wrongful.").
234. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 136.
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Constitution.,,235 In support, the Court relied upon its decision in Parker v.
Brown/36 in which it recognized state action immunity, or in other words, thatthe
Sherman Act does not apply to state programs that impose unreasonable
restraints upon trade. This reflects the understanding that a governmental
decision to act "reflects an independent governmental choice, constituting a
supervening 'cause' that breaks the link between a private party's request and the
plaintiff's injury.,,237 Along these lines, the Court characterized Noerr as merely
a "corollary to Parker" required because it would be "peculiar in a democracy,
and perhaps in derogation ofthe constitutional right 'to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances,' ... to establish a category of lawful state action that
citizens are not permitted to urge.,,238
Petitioning immunity is more than a mere corollary to state action immunity.
As mentioned earlier in Noerr, the Court was not asked to consider whether the
railroads could be held responsible for damages resulting from the Governor's
legislation of a bill favorable to the trucking industry, but instead whether the
railroads could be held responsible for injuring the truckers' relationships with
their customers through their publicity campaign and costs incurred by the
truckers in responding to that campaign with a publicity effort of their own.239
In other words, the truckers were seeking damages resulting directly from the act
of petitioning rather than indirectly through governmental action.240
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the petitioners were immune from
liability for those direct injuries because they inevitably result from any effort to
petition government, and "[t]o hold that the knowing infliction of such injury
renders the campaign itself illegal would thus be tantamount to outlawing all
such campaigns.,,241 In other words, the fact that customers may be lost because
of a lawsuit or negative public relations campaign and that defendants will incur
expenses in defending against a lawsuit or hiring lobbyists of their own, are
inevitably associated with any effort to solicit government action. Holding a
petitioner responsible for such costs simply because they are not caused by
government would eviscerate the right to petition. Accordingly, in order to
protect the act of petitioning itself, the Court concluded that petitioners could not
be punished for any injuries resulting directly from protected petitioning
activities. Because the Court concluded earlier that the conduct ofthe railroads
satisfied the means prong as valid petitioning activity, it rejected the truckers'
claims.
A similar analysis was followed in both Allied Tube and Superior Court,
even though in both cases the defendants were successful in obtaining
governmental action in their behalf. In determining whether the defendant could

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

/d.
317 U.S . 341 (1943).
AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, ~ 201, at 14.
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 379 (1991).
See Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 133-34.
See id. at 143.
/d. at 143-44.
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be held responsible for damages resulting from the exclusion of plastic conduits
from the 1981 Code, the Court emphasized that "where, independent of any
government action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from private
action, the restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is 'incidental'
to a valid effort to influence governmental action.,,242 Because the Court
concluded that Indian Head's manipulation of the private standard setting
association was not a valid petitioning effort, the Court held that its conduct was
not immunized, and the defendant was held responsible for $3 .8 million in lost
profits suffered by the plaintiff.243
Similarly, because the economic boycott in Superior Court was found to be
an invalid means of petitioning, the CJA lawyers could be subjected to antitrust
liability for the restraint upon trade resulting from their boycott. In particular, the
Court noted that the restraint was not the "intended consequence of public
action," but was "the means by which respondents sought to obtain favorable
legislation," and that "the emergency legislative response to the boycott put an
end to the restraint. ,,244 Once again, because the defendants' conduct was not
considered a valid means ofpetitioning, they were held responsible for the injury
to competition directly resulting from that conduct. The critical question in the
source prong, therefore, is whether the injury results from a valid effort to
influence government, not whether the government or a private actor is the
source ofthe harm, or whether the harm is characterized as direct or incidental.
When the alleged injury results not only from valid petitioning activities but
from government's response to that petition, the argument for immunity is even
stronger. Not only is the right to petition implicated, but the causal chain is
broken by the decision of an independent, financially disinterested, public
decision-maker. 24S As the Supreme Court recognized, it is "beyond the purpose
of the antitrust laws to identify and invalidate lawmaking" because it may have
been infected by selfish motives. 246 While this certainly adds an additional arrow
to the defendant's quiver ofimmunity arguments, the pivotal question is whether
the challenged conduct is considered valid petitioning. If the conduct is
considered valid petitioning, the petitioner is immune from all liability,
regardless of whether the injuries are caused by the defendant directly through
the act of petitioning itself or indirectly by governmental adoption of the
petitioner's position.247 In contrast, if the activity does not represent valid

242. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 499 (1988).
243. See id. at 498.
244. Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S . 411 , 425
(1990).
245. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 90, ~ 201, at 14.
246. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 383 (1991).
247. Some commentators have argued that given the importance of competitive economic
policy in this country, Noerr immunity should be narrowly tailored, especially given the possibility
for imposing considerable costs upon competitors directly through petitioning. See, e.g., Hurwitz,
supra note 7; Meyer, supra note 7. At least one commentator has argued that Noerr immunity
should not be granted if the defendant's conduct is in effect not the least restrictive means for
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petitioning, defendants are subject to antitrust scrutiny even ifthey are ultimately
successful in obtaining governmental action. As such, the means/source test can
be collapsed into a single inquiry: Is the private conduct a valid effort to
influence government?248

III. THE METHODOLOGY ApPLIED TO SETILEMENTS
Having proposed a methodology for determining whether immunity is
justified under the right to petition, the next step is to apply the analysis to the
settlement of litigation. Because settlements vary in "source, context, and
nature," this section examines whether the right to petition immunizes purely
private settlement agreements-those entered into between private litigants in
which no court approval is sought or required. 249 An analysis of private
.settlements under the means/source test clearly leads to the conclusion that such
agreements are not protected by the right to petition.
When private parties enter into settlement agreements, the right to petition
is not implicated. For the purposes of this discussion, private settlements are
settlements arrived at between parties to the litigation in which dismissal of the
action is accomplished by stipulation under Rule 41(a)(1) ofthe Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.25o Under those circumstances, judicial approval of the

achieving governmental action and the action sought is illegitimate. See Meyer, supra note 7, at
832. These arguments diminish the importance of the right to petition while elevating the values
of free-market economics. The right to petition is guaranteed in our Constitution to ensure that
government remains responsive to the people. If the people want to eliminate the Shennan Act,
impose a command economy, or even eliminate government altogether, it is their prerogative to do
so. Similarly, while it may make sense as a matter of economic policy to require defendants to
choose the least costly means of petitioning government, such a requirement would impennissibly
chill the right to petition by subjecting petitioners to SLAPP suits in which the government or
private parties are allowed to second guess the means by which political or private change is sought.
248. By focusing on whether challenged conduct is valid petitioning without reference to
antitrust laws or principles, the means/source test is equally useful for identifying conduct that falls
under the protection of the right to petition when that conduct is alleged to have violated other laws.
249. Court approved settlement agreements or consent decrees in the context of: )) voluntary
dismissals under Rule 4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; 2) class action settlements under
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and 3) government prosecutions under the
Antitrust Procedures and Penalty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16, are the subject of Part IV.
250. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(1) provides:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 23( e), of Rule 66, and of any statute of the United
States, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing
a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or of
a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of
dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise stated
in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that
a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an
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settlement agreement is neither required nor permitted. 25t While the antitrust
laws do not preclude parties from entering into settlement agreements, that does
not mean that those parties are necessarily absolved from any anticompetitive
harm resulting from those agreements. Applying the means/source test to
settlements demonstrates that such conduct should not be immune from antitrust
scrutiny.
The first step in the means/source analysis is to determine whether the
conduct in question can be considered petitioning.2S2 Private settlements fail to
satisfy this first prong because they are in fact the antithesis of efforts to solicit
government action. While lobbying legislatures or public officials, conducting
pUblicity campaigns, and filing lawsuits are all attempts to persuade an
independent government decision-maker to adopt one's view, no similar claim
can be made when private parties enter into a settlement agreement. When
private parties enter into a settlement agreement, they are affirmatively
withdrawing consideration of the matter from the decisionmaking authority of
government. Under those circumstances, the parties are no longer attempting to
persuade government to adopt a potentially anticompetitive policy, nor are they
soliciting government action. Instead, they have officially given up any such
effort and are acting on their own. As the nature of the conduct does not
represent petitioning, there is no need to determine whether that petitioning .
activity was in accordance with the rules ofthe judicial forum. Consequently,
private settlement agreements clearly fail the means prong ofthe Noerr analysis.
Even though failure of the means prong is sufficient to deny immunity,
private settlement agreements also fail the source prong ofthe Noerr analysis. 253
When private parties enter into a settlement agreement without judicial
participation, any anticompetitive effects arising from the agreement can in no
way be fairly attributed to valid petitioning activity. As the Supreme Court has
recognized in another context, a settlement agreement is simply a contract, for
which part ofthe consideration is the dismissal ofa lawsuit. 254 Given the private
nature of these agreements, we can legitimately question whether the public's
interests are being considered, let alone vindicated, by these private attorneys
general. 25S As recognized by Professor Fiss, "[T]he bargain is at best contractual
and does not contain the kind of enforcement commitment already embodied in

action based on or including the same claim.

Id.
251. See 9 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2363, at 270-72 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
252.

See supra Part II.A.

253. As discussed earlier, the means/source test can actually be collapsed into a single
inquiry: does the private conduct represent valid petitioning. This, however, does not make the
source prong irrelevant. There may be circumstances in which the conduct in question represents
valid petitioning, but is not the source of the antitrust injury. The source prong, therefore, is
necessary to protect competitors from injurious conduct not protected under the First Amendment.
254. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994).
255. See generally Fiss, supra note 126.
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a decree that is the product of a trial and the judgment of a court.,,256
Consequently, any resulting harm to competition finds its source in that contract
and the market power wielded by the signatories.257 Under those circumstances,
government action is not solicited, nor will it be unless a court is subsequently
asked to enforce the terms ofthat contract in the event ofa disagreement between
the parties.2S8
Consequently, the central justifications for Noerr immunity are absent in the
context of settlement agreements. This conclusion should be the same even if a
court would have ordered the same remedy. "The fact that Congress through
utilization of the precise methods here employed could seek to reach the same
objectives sought by respondents does not mean that respondents or any other
group may do so without specific Congressional authority.,,259 Immunity from
antitrust scrutiny or any other laws for that matter is not based upon whether the
outcomes are acceptable or permissible, but depends upon the means used to
achieve those outcomes?60 By withdrawing the matter from government
consideration, parties to a private settlement agreement have steered a course
outside the protection of the right to petition.
The conclusion that private settlement agreements are not insulated from
antitrust scrutiny is consistent with existing case law. The only court decision
on point is In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litigation261 that involved
five antitrust lawsuits against various producers and suppliers ofnatural gas. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had engaged in price fixing in violation of
the Sherman ACt. 262 The price fixing was allegedly the result of the settlement
of claims in a separate litigation brought by the producers of natural gas against
the supplier. 263 The separate litigation involved, among other things, the
interpretation of"favored nations (or price equalization) clauses" in the contracts
between the producers and the supplier. 264 The defendants in the subsequent
action claimed that the initiation, prosecution, and settlement of the earlier
lawsuits were exempt from antitrust liability under the Noerr doctrine.265
The court disagreed and held that "a private settlement accomplished without
Court participation should not be afforded Noerr-Pennington protection.,,266

256.
257.

ld. at 1085.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263 .
264 .
265.
266.

See id.

Additionally, disparities in power between the parties may also lead us to question
whether the terms of the agreement are even just between them. See id. at 1075-82 (noting that the
sett lement process may be infected by coercion, unequal bargaining power, and the absence of
authoritative consent).
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co ., 310 U.S. 150, 225-26 (1940).
See supra Part II.A.
No. 403, 1982 WL 1827 (D.N.M., Jan. 26, 1982).
See id. at *4.
See id.
Id. at *4 n.8.
See id. at *5.
ld. at • 6.
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According to the court:
When parties petition a Court for judicial action [Noerr] protection
attaches, but when they voluntarily withdraw their dispute from the court
and resolve it by agreement among themselves there would be no
purpose served by affording Noerr-Pennington protection. The parties
by so doing must abide with any antitrust consequences that result from
their settlement. The defendants have pointed to no case which would
afford Noerr-Pennington protection to private settlement of litigation,
and logic would indicate no reason why there should be such
protection. 267
The court opined, however, that the result may be different when "the settlement
was submitted to the Court and approved in an order of dismissal of the case.,,268
The defendants argued that because the settlement had been submitted and
incorporated as part ofthe order ofdismissal the settlement is immunized, while
the plaintiffs argued that the sham exception would apply. 269 The court declined
to reach the issue at that stage of the litigation. 270 The district court's decision
in In re New Mexico Gas, therefore, clearly supports the conclusion that private
settlements are not immune merely because the parties to the agreement have
"voluntarily" withdrawn their request for governmental decision-making and ·
acted on their own.
The FTC has also concluded that private settlement agreements are not
exempt from antitrust scrutiny. In In re YKK, Inc., 271 the FTC concluded that the
terms of a settlement offer constituted unfair competition. The case involved
competitors, YKK Incorporated and Talon Incorporated, who manufactured and
sold zippers. 272 An attorney for YKK sent a letter accusing Talon of "unfair and
predatory sales tactics" by offering free equipment to customers. 273 Apparently,
YKK offered to drop the matter if both agreed to stop providing free
equipment.274 The Commission concluded that "[a]n agreement between Talon
and YKK to cease this form of discounting would have constituted an
The concurring opinion of
unreasonable restraint of competition.,,275
Commissioner Deborah K. Owen notes that any agreement between YKK and
Talon would have represented the settling of "allegations of unlawful price
discrimination.,,276 The fact that the agreement would have represented such a

267.
268.
269.
immunity.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275 .
276.

Id.
Id. at *7.
See infra Part IV for a discussion whether court approval of settlements justifies
See In re New Mexico Natural Gas Litig., 1982 WL 1827, at ·7.
F.T .C. 628 (1993).
See id. at 629.
See id.
See id. at 641 (concurring statement of Comm'r Starek).
Id. at 629.
Id. at 641.
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settlement did not, however, prevent the FTC from scrutinizing its
anticompetitive nature.
The context of private settlement, however, does not remove from
antitrust scrutiny inherently suspect conduct that lacks an efficiency
justification. In civil cases generally, a legitimate intent or purpose
would not justify a restraint that has unreasonably anticompetitive
effects. Moreover, even a good faith attempt to avoid Robinson-Patman
liability will not excuse anticompetitive conduct that is clearly
inconsistent with the broader purposes of the U.S. antitrust laws.277
Commissioner Starek also noted that even ifYKK's invitation was a good faith
offer of settlement, the terms of that settlement exceeded the scope of what was
"reasonably necessary to achieve a settlement. The potential effects of such an
invitation are unambiguously anticompetitive.'027s
Assuming arguendo that YKK's threats of litigation were made in good
faith, the appropriate quid pro quo for the competitor's commitment to
cease from engaging in the putative violation was YKK's commitment
to forgo initiating litigation. YKK, however, went further, offering to
discontinue an important form of discounting in exchange for the
competitor's commitment to discontinue such discounting. This conduct
poses a substantial threat to competition, particularly in cases such as
this where the evidence strongly suggests that the relevant firms, acting
in concert, have market power. 279
Commissioner Starek concluded by stating that "competitors attempting to
resolve claims of unlawful discounting under the Robinson-Patman Act [should]
understand that any settlement or attempted settlement must pass scrutiny under
U.S. antitrust laws forbidding unreasonable restraints of trade . .. .',2S0
Commissioner Dennis A. Yao, in his concurring statement, also stressed that
YKK went beyond requesting that Talon cease any allegedly unlawful
practices. 281 He stressed that:
Although the Commission must take care in cases like this to avoid any
misimpression that mere settlement discussions could lead to a Section
5 action, the Commission cannot abdicate its responsibility to challenge
an unlawful invitation to collude solely because it occurs during an
otherwise lawful conversation.282
Both concurrences make clear that even good faith efforts at settling disputes and

Id. at 642 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 643 .
Id. (footnotes omitted).
280. Id. at 643-44.
281. See id. at 645 (concurring statement ofComm'r Yao)("Most importantly, the lawyer's
actions here went beyond requesting that his client's competitor cease an allegedly unlawful
practice ....").
282. ld. at 646.
277.

278.
279.
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the agreements that arise from those efforts are subject to antitrust scrutiny.
They also esta.blish a rule, or at least a presumption, that settlement agreements
represent unreasonable restraints if they require more than the cessation of the
allegedly unlawful practice in exchange for not bringing or dismissing a lawsuit.
The only appellate court decision to touch upon this question is the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc. 283 In that case, the defendant in a private antitrust suit
argued that the plaintiff's refusal to settle the litigation violated the antitrust
laws. 284 In rejecting this argument, the court stated that, "[aJ decision to accept
or reject an offer ofsettlement is conduct incidental to the prosecution ofthe suit
and not a separate and distinct activity which might form the basis for antitrust
liability.,,28s Because the Supreme Court held that beginning a lawsuit cannot be
the basis for antitrust liability, the Ninth Circuit's holding that refusing to settle
an ongoing lawsuit cannot form the basis for antitrust liability is not only
consistent with that rule, but required. The rejection of a settlement offer
represents nothing less than a decision to continue the petitioning effort. It
would be strange indeed if the First Amendment protected the right to begin
petitioning but not the right to continue to engage in petitioning conduct.
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the court's dicta that a decision to
accept a settlement is likewise insulated.
While the symmetry of "accept or reject" is facially appealing, it is not
consistent with the overall thrust of Noerr immunity which, as discussed above,
only applies: (1) to legitimate efforts to persuade the government as an
independent decision-maker, and (2) when the alleged antitrust injury results
from valid petitioning activity.286 With the exception ofthe unsupported dicta in
Professional Real Estate Investors, the conclusion that private settlement
agreements are not immunized by the right to petition is consistent not only with
Supreme Court interpretation but also with the only decision to actually address
the issue.
IV. THE METHODOLOGY ApPLIED TO CONSENT DECREES
The main wrinkle in the argument that the settlement agreements are subject
to antitrust scrutiny and not exempt under the First Amendment arises when the
agreements are approved by a court and entered as consent decrees. As one court
recognized, there is an argument that agreements approved by a court should
have a different status under Noerr than purely private agreements. 287
Judicial approval of settlements is required in several different contexts.
First, under Rule 41 ofthe Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judicial approval is

283.
284.
285 .
286 .
287.
(D.N.M.,

944 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1991), afJ'd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 49 (1992).
See id. at 1528.
ld.
See supra Part lILA-B.
See In re New Mexico Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 403, 1982 WL 1827, at *7
Jan. 26, 1982).
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required when dismissal is sought unilaterally.288 Second, in class actions, a
court must determine whether the entry of a judgment is in the public interest
under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.289 Lastly, under the
Antitrust Procedure and Penalty Act, a court is authorized to enter a final
judgment and consent decree only after the receipt of comments on the
competitive impact ofthe proposed settlement and ajudicial determination that
the consent decree is in the public interest. 290 Assuming that the parties would
not abide by the terms of the settlement absent judicial approval and
incorporation into a court order, it would be difficult to separate the source ofthe
antitrust harm from government as opposed to private action. Court approval,
however, still does not bring settlement agreements within the scope ofthe Noerr
doctrine because, as the following discussion demonstrates, the First Amendment
justifications are still absent. First, the conduct in question still does not
represent an attempt to solicit government action. Second, even if seeking
judicial approval of a private agreement could be considered petitioning, doing
so to insulate anticompetitive conduct would not be considered valid petitioning.

A. Non-petitioning Means
Agreements approved by a court and incorporated into ajudicial order should
not be immunized for the same reasons that private settlements were not immune
under the right to petition-the means associated with and culminating in the
settlement do not represent petitioning. Whereas private settlement agreements
clearly represent private contracts, consent decrees represent a hybrid between
contract and judicial decree.291 Despite the judicial involvement, the means
employed in reaching the agreement are still the same as those used to enter into
private settlement or any private commercial contract. Accordingly, the means
used still do not represent an effort to solicit government action by presenting the
merits of their claims for a judge to decide. The parties to the settlement are
affirmatively withdrawing the merits ofthe decision from the judge and jury, and
resolving the dispute among themselves to acquire "a bargained for arrangement

288. See FED. R. CIv. P. 41(a) & (b).
289. See id. Rule 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the
approval of the court . . ..").
290. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e) (1994).
291. See Lorain NAACP v. Lorain Bd. ofEduc., 979 F.2d 1141, 1148 (6th Cir. 1992) ("The
consent decree is . .. ' a voluntary settlement agreement which could be fully effective without
judicial intervention' and ' a final judicial order ... plac[ing] the power and prestige of the court
behind the compromise struck by the parties. '" (quoting Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 920
(6th Cir. \983))); Jed Goldfarb, Keeping Rufo in Its Cell: The Modification ofAntitrust Consent
Decrees After Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 625, 630 (1997) ("The
prevailing modern view is that a consent decree is a hybrid, possessing attributes of both a contract
and ajudicial decree."); Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights ofThird Parties, 87 MICH .
L. REv. 321, 324 (\988) (noting the dominance of the hybrid view).
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[which] more closely resembles a contract than an injunction.,,292 In so doing, the
parties can be treated as orchestrating the decision-making process by privately
negotiating the terms of the settlement and then presenting them to the court as
a/ait accompli which any court would be hard-pressed to reject. 293 Settlement
resolves the ongoing dispute before a court by depriving the "court of the
occasion, and perhaps even the ability, to render an interpretation" ofthe law and
the facts.294 Given that "[p]arties might settle while leaving justice undone,,,295
the context and nature of judicially approved consent decrees is closer to the
quintessential private economic agreement unprotected by the First Amendment
and subject to antitrust scrutiny than a judicial decree following a trial on the
merits.
Moreover, as demonstrated by both Allied Tube and Superior Court,
subsequent governmental approval does not immunize otherwise non-petitioning
conduct. 296 Under these circumstances, court-approved settlements could be
analogized to the conduct found wanting in Allied Tube where the producer of
steel conduits orchestrated the decision-making process of the private
association. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court concluded that immunity
was not justified even though the defendant actually sought government approval
of the Code as adopted by the association, influencing the association was the
most effective means of influencing government, and the defendant was
successful in obtaining governmental approval in numerous instances.297
Similarly, in Superior Court, the Court found thatthe CJ A attorneys' boycott was
not petitioning because it was a quintessential horizontal restraint oftrade and an
attempt to coerce governmental action rather than an effort to persuade on the
merits. 298 Even though parties to a lawsuit may genuinely seek governmental
approval of the terms of their settlement and successfully obtain approval, the
non-petitioning nature of their conduct should be sufficient to subject them to
antitrust scrutiny.299

292. Fiss, supra note 126, at 1084.
293 . See id. at 1085 ("A court cannot proceed (or not proceed very far) in the face of a
settlement. ").
294. [d.
295. [d.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 188-225.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 188-207.
298. Although both cases may be distinguished because they dealt with conduct that
independently imposed restraints of trade regardless of whether or not government acted and a
proposed settlement would have no adverse impact on competition until it is approved by a court,
the reasoning in both decisions is still applicable.
299. This does not mean that the parties' actual presentation to the court for judicial approval
cannot be considered protected petitioning, but rather that the prior acts of negotiating the
settlement and ultimately the settlement itself would not be considered protected petitioning.
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B. Invalid Means
Even assuming that asking a court to approve a settlement could nonetheless
be considered petitioning and that the petitioning would include the act of
negotiating and entering into the settlement itself, it is by no means clear that the
petitioning would be considered valid ifthe parties are seekingjudicial approval
of the anticompetitive consequences of the settlement. First, as the following
. discussion demonstrates, judicial approval of settlement agreements does not
usually represent judicial approval of the anticompetitive effects of the
agreement. Second, in general, courts do not have the authority to immunize
anticompetitive conduct. Under those circumstances, private parties know or
should know that judicial approval does not mean approval ofthe anti competitive
consequences of their agreement, and their effort to claim authorization is
therefore fraudulent. Furthermore, if the court specifically "approves" any
resulting restraint upon trade, such approval is beyond the court's authority. In
either case, the petitioning activity would be considered invalid.
1. Approval of What?- To begin with, it is not necessary to assume that
judicial "approval" ofa settlement agreement represents government sanctioning
of anticompetitive harm for the purposes of Noerr immunity. As the Supreme
Court consistently reminds us, "Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly
implied.,,3°O Determining whether a court can be said to have approved any
restraint upon competition embodied in a settlement would be a necessary
predicate to determining whether the agreement can be immunized as an effort
to solicit valid governmental action.
In general, when asked to approve a settlement agreement, a court is not
being asked to determine liability or approve the substance of the agreement. In
fact, most agreements expressly deny any admission ofliability. Consequently,
the court is not being asked to enforce the law. 3ot Nor is the court specifically
being asked to approve the anticompetitive effects of the agreement. When the
dismissal is accomplished by stipulation pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), judicial
approval is not required, and courts cannot impose additional conditions. 302
Unless the parties mutually agree to court approval, a district court is not even
permitted to enter that the agreement "So Ordered.,,303 Likewise, while Rule
41(a)(2) does require judicial approval when a party unilaterally moves for
dismissal, approval under those circumstances merely represents a judicial
determination that the non-moving party will not be prejudiced by the
dismissal. 304 Approval under Rule 41 is, therefore, at best limited to the
conclusion that the agreement is fair with respect to the parties entering into the

300. California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962).
301. See Eastern RR. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S . 127, 138
(196)) ("[T]he Sherman Act does not apply to the ... mere solicitation ofgovernmental action with
respect to the . .. enforcement of laws. ").
302. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 251, at 270-72.
303. Gardiner v. A.H. Robins, Co., 747 F.2d ) 180 (8th Cir~ 1984).
304. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 251, at 278-79.
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agreement. Consequently, the scope of judicial approval of settlement
agreements under Rule 41 is exceptionally narrow, and the court is under no
obligation, and arguably has no authority, to evaluate the anticompetitive effects
of settlements.
While the judicial role in class actions is noticeably greater, its scope of
review is likewise insufficient to justifY antitrust immunity. Under Rule 23(e),
a district court acts as a fiduciary guarding the rights ofabsent class members and
the public in general. 305 It cannot accept a settlement agreement that the
proponents have not demonstrated to be "fair, reasonable, and adequate.,,306
However, "neither the trial court in approving the settlement nor this Court in
reviewing that approval have the right or the duty to reach any ultimate
conclusions on the issues of fact and law which underlie the merits of the
dispute.,,307 A court, therefore, does not have the power or the authority to
review the underlying facts and law to determine whether a settlement violates
the antitrust laws. "[U]nless, the terms of the agreement are per se violations of
antitrust law," the court may only apply a reasonableness standard ofreview. 308
As such, even in the context of Rule 23, judicial approval is quite limited.
In contrast to both Rule 41 and Rule 23, section 16 ofthe Antitrust Procedure
and Penalty Act establishes detailed procedures for judicial review of
anticompetitive harms resulting from consent decrees and specifically requires
court's to determine whether such agreements are in the public interest. 309 For
example, the statute provides for publication ofthe terms ofthe proposed consent
decree, pUblication of a competitive impact statement, written comments by the
United States, publication ofthe procedures for modifYing the proposed consent
decree, and a requirement that the court determine that the entry of the consent
decree is in the public interest considering the competitive impact of the
judgment. 3IO In making the public interest determination, the court is not limited
to the parties before it, but may rely upon expert witnesses, appoint a special
master, and authorize the participation of"interested persons.,,311 Unlike consent
decrees entered under Rules 41 and 23, with section 16 agreements it would be
possible to argue that court approval included approval of the anticompetitive
consequences of the agreement. Not only is the court allowed to consider any
restraint upon competition, it has a duty to make that inquiry, and cannot enter
judgment unless it concludes that the agreement is in the public interest.
Petitioning immunity, however, would not apply with respect to consent
decrees entered under section 16 for a very simple but very different reason.

305 . See FED. R. elv. P. 23(e).
306. Grunin v. International House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 864 (1975).
307. ld. at 123 (citations omitted).
308. ld. at 124.
309. See 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
310. See id. § 16(b)-(t).
311. ld. § 16(e)-(t).

2000)

THE RIGHT TO PETITION

431

Section 16 only applies in cases brought by or on behalf of the United States.312
In other words, section 16 is limited to civil and criminal prosecutions. The
defendants in such cases, therefore, are not exercising their right to petition, but
are instead defending themselves from government prosecution.
As
demonstrated by the history of the right to petition, petitioning immunity exists
to protect affirmative efforts to invoke governmental power. The right to petition
government for redress is, therefore, not implicated under section 16 agreements.
If immunity is to be granted under these circumstances it would be under the
"state action" doctrine rather than petitioning.
Given the limited nature and authority ofcourt "approval" under Rule 41 and
Rule 23 , it would be difficult to argue that judicial approval of a settlement
represents approval of any potential restraint upon trade embodied in the
.settlement.
2. The Limits ofJudicial Approval.-Moreover, in addition to questioning
whether a court has in fact "approved" a restraint upon competition embodied in
a consent decree, it is questionable whether a court has the power to give such
approval. As a general matter, courts cannot enforce illegal agreements, and the
Supreme Court has consistently held agreements that violate the antitrust laws
unenforceable. 313 Consequently, petitioning immunity could be denied on the
basis that asking a court to approve a settlement that restrained trade is an invalid
form of petitioning under the rules governing the judicial system.
While there is some disagreement among the Justices as to the
appropriateness of illegality as a defense to contract law,3J4 there is universal
agreement that courts cannot lend their authority to acts which would make "the
courts a party to the carrying out of one of the very restraints forbidden by the
Sherman Act."m The disagreements among the Justices and the exceptions to
this rule involve cases in which the defense is raised by a defendant who has
benefitted from a plaintiffs performance under the challenged contract seeking
to enjoy the benefits of that performance without the corresponding obligation
to perform its part ofthe bargain. 316 In those cases, the disagreement among the
Justices is not whether the courts may enforce agreements in violation of the

312. See id § 16(b).
313 . See, e.g., Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Mullins, 455 U.S. 72, 79-80 (1982) (holding that a
collective bargaining agreement which restrained trade could not be enforced); Kelly v. Kosuga,
358 U.S. 516, 520 (1959) (recognizing that a contract cannot be enforced if "the judgement of the
Court would itself be enforcing the precise conduct made unlawful" by the antitrust laws.);
Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight& Sons Co., 212 U.S. 227, 261-62() 909) (holding that
a contract for the sale and purchase of wallpaper which was an integral part of a scheme to
monopolize the wallpaper industry could not be enforced).
314. See Kosuga, 358 U.S. at 518 ("As a defense to an action based on contract, the plea of
illegality based on violation of the Sherman Act has not met with much favor in this Court.")
(footnote omitted).
315. [d. at 520 (citation omitted).
316. See id at 518.
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Sherman Act, but whether the particular promise is such an agreement.317
For example, in Kelly v. Kosuga, the plaintiff and defendant were both
engaged in the business ofmarketing onions. 318 Defendant admittedly purchased
fifty cars of onions from the plaintiff, but refused to pay. Instead, the defendant
argued that the sale was made pursuant to a general agreement between himself,
the plaintiff, and other marketers ofonions not to deliver plaintiff's onions to the
futures market for the remainder ofthe season.319 According to the defendant
such an agreement pertained to the prices of onions and limited the quantity of
onions sold in Illinois.320 The Supreme Court rejected the defense noting "the
narrow scope in which the defense is allowed in respect to the Sherman
Act .... "321 Interpreting its prior precedents, the Court noted that the defense
has been upheld only when "the judgment ofthe Court would itself be enforcing
the precise conduct made unlawful by the Act."m Because the sale of onions
could be separated from the agreement not to restrict the supply of onions
available on the market, the defense did not apply.323
Even recognizing the narrow scope of the illegality rule, efforts to seek
judicial approval and enforcement of settlements agreements which themselves
embody the prohibited restraint upon trade clearly violate the rule. In that
respect, the situation is closer to the facts of Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis
Voight & Sons Co.324 In that case, the plaintiff sought the enforcement of a .
contract for the sale and purchase of wallpaper which it admitted "was intended
by the parties to be based upon agreements that were and are essential parts of
an illegal scheme [to restrain trade]."325 The plaintiff corporation was created by
nearly all of the wallpaper manufacturers at the time and sold the wallpaper to
"jobbers.,,326 The plaintiff and the jobbers entered into an agreement in which
the jobbers would purchase all their wallpaper from the plaintiff. The jobbers
further agreed that they would not sell the wallpaper at terms better or prices
lower than those offered by the plaintiff. 327 Jobbers who were not part of this

317. See, e.g., id. at 521 (allowing the enforcement of a contract for the sale of onions at a
fair price because the sales agreement was separate from another agreement between the parties not
to deliver onions to the futures market); Continental Wall Paper, 212 U.S. ,at 267-68 (Holmes, 1.,
dissenting) (arguing that "[t]he actual contracts by which the plaintiff bound itself to deliver, and
the sales under which it did deliver, the specific goods for which it seeks to recover the price," were
a separate transaction from the general agreement restraining trade),
318 , SeeKosuga,358U,S.at517 ,
319, See id.
320, See id.
321. Id. at 520,
322. M (citation omitted).
323 , See id. at 521.
324. 212 U.S, 227 (1909),
325. M at 261.
326. Id. at 267-68.
327. See id.
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combination were driven out of business. 328 According to the Court, the plaintiff
sought "a judgment that will give effect ... to agreements that constituted the
combination, and by means of which the combination proposes to accomplish
forbidden ends.,,329 This, the Court could not do. "[S]uch ajudgment cannot be
granted without departing from the statutory rule, long established in the
jurisprudence of both this country and England, that a court will not lend its aid,
in any way, to a party seeking to realize the fruits of an agreement that appears
to be tainted with illegality ... .'>330
This conclusion is consistent with the principle that public "officials have no
independent authority to exempt conduct from the antitrust laws.,,331 As the
Supreme Court held:
[T]hough employees of the government may have known of those
[restraints of trade] and winked at them or tacitly approved them, no
immunity would have thereby been obtained. For Congress had
specified the precise manner and method of securing immunity. None
other would suffice. Otherwise national policy on such grave and
important issues as this would be determined not by Congress nor by
those to whom Congress had delegated authority but by virtual
volunteers. 332
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has consistently held that before state or federal
officials can be considered to have granted immunity from antitrust liability to
private actors, their authority to do so must be clearly and expressly articulated
either as a matter of state law333 or federal statute. 334

328.
329.
330.

See id.
Id. at 262.
Id
ALD, supra note 6, at 964.

331.
332. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,226-27 (1940).
333. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988)("The challenged restraint must be
'one clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy. '" (quoting California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980»). These decisions
involved whether private conduct can be considered immunized under the state action doctrine
which, as articulated by Midcal, not only requires that the anticompetitive policy be clearly
articulated by the state, the conduct must be "actively supervised by the state itself." Midcal,445
U.S. at 105. Interestingly, under this analogous doctrine, the Supreme Court has questioned
whether "state courts, acting in their judicial capacity, can adequately supervise private conduct for
purposes of the state-action doctrine." Patrick, 486 U.S. at 103.
334. See, e.g., California v. Federal Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485-86 (1962)
(concluding that the Natural Gas Act provided no express exemption from antitrust laws and that
the Federal Power Commission was not given the power to enforce the antitrust laws); United States
v. Radio Corp. ofAm., 358 U.S. 334, 352-53 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring) (concluding that FCC
approval of a contract between NBC and Westinghouse to acquire certain television stations under
a "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard did not bar antitrust review). For a detailed
discussion of these to doctrines as applied to the approval of settlements, see Koniak & Cohen,
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Consequently, when the settlement agreement itself represents the restraint
of trade, courts cannot lend their aid or authority to such agreements. Under
those circumstances, even ifthe conduct can be considered petitioning, it cannot
be considered valid petitioning. The parties to the agreement would either be
fraudulently concealing the anticompetitive nature of their agreement because
they know that the court could not otherwise approve it, or they would be asking
the court itself to engage in clearly prohibited conduct by approving an otherwise
illegal agreement. Under either circumstance, petitioning immunity would not
be justified. m
CONCLUSION

While the right to petition was once considered the most fundamental right
ofthe English because it was the principal means for criticizing government and
seeking political change, its importance under the United States Constitution has
been overshadowed by other cognate rights. Freedom of speech and expanded
rights of political participation provide additional avenues for seeking the ends
once protected by petitioning alone. Despite this diminished prominence, the
Noerr doctrine demonstrates that the right to petition remains a vital part of our
constitutional system of government by affording immunity for efforts to solicit
government action. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the boundaries of the right .
are so poorly defined.
By examining petitioning's history and the development of the Noerr
doctrine, this Article suggests a methodology for determining whether conduct
is protected by the right to petition. Focusing on whether the private conduct is
a valid effort to influence government, the means/source analysis both clarifies
and simplifies the immunity analysis while remaining true to petitioning's
constitutional status and its history. By limiting petitioning immunity to valid
persuasive efforts, the means/source analysis also minimizes any potential
conflict between the First Amendment and the antitrust laws without
overemphasizing the values embodied in the antitrust laws. Lastly, by applying
this analysis to the settlement of litigation, we see that while the symmetry of
immunizing decisions to either "accept or reject" a settlement is facially
appealing, it does not withstand deeper analysis. By affirmatively withdrawing
their dispute from governmental deliberation, parties to settlements are
responsible for any restraints upon competition that may result from their
agreements even if a judge approves the settlement.

supra note 8.
335 . See supra Part II.A.I.

